STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: November 18, 1947

FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

SUBJECT: [redacted] b7D
LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

COGOG

On October 31, 1947, confidential informant [redacted] of this office, advised that [redacted] contacted [redacted], the subject of Washington Field Office file 100-17709, and told him that she was not known to [redacted] but that a friend of hers had suggested that she contact him. She stated that she was in a serious situation and when [redacted] asked her what the trouble was, she said that her husband had been questioned for two days by the Secret Service. She told [redacted] she would have contacted him sooner but she did not realize what was going on and she requested that he help her. [redacted] indicated that he would handle the matter. b7D

The files of the Washington Field Office indicated that [redacted] had previously been reported to this office by a [redacted] a stenographer in the Treasury Department. [redacted] merely said that [redacted] is a Jewish economist who constantly reads Russian propaganda in the office, and indicated that she thought him to be a Communist.

On November 3, 1947, Special Agent VINCENT W. HUGHES of this office contacted Agent TOM KELLY, Secret Service, Treasury Department, and inquired about any information that he had concerning [redacted]. It was not disclosed to Mr. KELLY that information had been received concerning this matter through informant [redacted] Agent KELLY advised that his office had made a personnel investigation within the last few weeks of [redacted] and that during the course of their investigation they had uncovered information to make them believe that he may be a Communist. Accordingly, he had been interrogated by Agents of the Secret Service and admitted to them that he had been a member of the Communist Party for a period of some two months. Mr. KELLY advised that there was no indication that [redacted] had ever engaged in any espionage activities. He further stated that copies of the report on [redacted] were in the process of being typed at the present time and would be turned over to the FBI within a period of a few weeks. b7D

* * * * * * * *

It is believed that the above set of facts constitute a good possibility of developing [redacted] as a confidential informant who

VWH:JC
121-
cc-100-17070

11-21-47

Director, FBI
RE: [redacted] b7D

could be used as a source of information in the Communist Party government group in Washington, and particularly for those members of the Party in the Treasury Department.

It would be necessary to take the following steps in order to develop this individual.

1. The Treasury Department, and in particular, the Secret Service would have to be contacted and have it explained to them what this office desires to do in connection with [redacted] namely, that they would like to use him for the purpose of obtaining further information concerning Communist Party members in the Government. It would be necessary to obtain from the Treasury Department an agreement that they would not discharge [redacted] until this office has had an opportunity to develop him as an informant. It should be pointed out here that at the time Mr. KELLY of the Secret Service was contacted he stated that as a result of their investigation [redacted] would undoubtedly be discharged from the Treasury Department by one means or another. b7D

2. After having obtained the above agreement from the Treasury Department, Agents of this office would have to contact [redacted] directly and present to him the fact that his services with the Government will undoubtedly be terminated because of his Communist background unless he evinces additional cooperation with the Government, by which we mean that he will have to go into great detail as to all of his past, and in particular his present activities with the Communist Party, and further that he must activate himself, providing he is not presently active, in the Communist Party government group for the purpose of informing interested Government Agencies. It is considered likely that the threat of economic hardship to himself, his wife and his children by the loss of his job will go far in encouraging [redacted] to cooperate with this office.

* * * * * * * *

This case further presents a pattern that may be well to consider in the overall loyalty program in obtaining information concerning Communists

b7D

operating in the many government agencies by developing an informant in each of the government agencies for the purpose of exposing other Communists. The development of these informants may be materially assisted by the knowledge that they will lose their jobs upon their failure to cooperate.

The Bureau's views are being requested on the above proposition for developing informants by this method in connection with loyalty investigations, and the Bureau is being specifically requested as to whether or not affirmative steps should be taken in the case of [redacted] to develop him as a confidential informant. An early reply on this matter would be appreciated in view of the fact that it is likely [redacted] will be discharged at any time.

States Department of
General Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 160
Series 1947

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

December 6, 1947

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
	BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
	BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
	BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
	BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

(A) LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947 -- It has come to the Bureau's attention that certain individuals who are union officials, Communist Party members and informants for the Bureau in infiltration of labor organization cases, have been placed in a delicate position by virtue of Section 101, Subsection 9 (h), of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947. This Section requires that certain union officials must file an affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board stating they are not members of the Communist Party, affiliated with the Communist Party or affiliated with any other organization which advocates the overthrow of this Government by force or other illegal means. In certain cases informants who are officials of a predominantly anti-Communist union, have by virtue of this Section been faced with the alternative of not filing the affidavit and risking the loss of their union positions or filing a fraudulent affidavit.

The Bureau, of course, will not and cannot authorize any informant to file a fraudulent affidavit. At the same time it is recognized that good informants in labor infiltration cases are of great importance to the Bureau. It is also recognized that they are difficult to develop. It is anticipated that certain of these informants, when confronted by this dilemma, will request Bureau assistance to resolve their difficulties. It is believed that certain of the informants will base their plea for assistance on the grounds that they joined the Communist Party to increase their value as informants for the Bureau. While it is realized that these informants joined the Party on their own volition, such an allegation on their part could result in embarrassment for the Bureau.

166-2542-3-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 DMC/JC

DEC 12 1947

Should these informants be instructed to resolve their difficulties under this Section of the Act as they see fit, it will undoubtedly result in several disgruntled informants who no longer wish to cooperate with the Bureau.

A possible solution to this problem has been suggested by information recently received concerning the action contemplated by certain Communist Party members who are also officials of a major CIO union. It has been reported that these individuals, with the knowledge and the consent of the Party, intend to submit their resignations as Party members and to comply with the provisions of Section 101, Subsection 9 (h) of this Act. The Communist Party, in at least one section of the country, has indicated that it recognizes the purpose behind these resignations as prompted by reasons of security and to enable these individuals to comply with the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947.

It is suggested, therefore, that if an informant such as described above, requests advice of a Bureau Division as to what action he take with reference to filing a non-Communist affidavit under this Statute, the action contemplated by the Party and union officials in the case mentioned above might be outlined to the informant. This informant could then determine the course of action he intends to follow. In the event he chooses to resign from the Party and the Party recognizes that his resignation is prompted by security reasons and to comply with the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, his effectiveness as an informant will not be impaired.

Under no circumstances should you instruct such an informant to adopt this procedure, but rather should it be left for him to determine the course of action he will pursue with reference to this problem. No assurance should be given to any informant, either expressed or implied, that he may file a fraudulent affidavit with the consent of the Bureau.

In the event an informant of your office requests advice as to the procedure he should follow under this Section of the Act, you should advise the Bureau immediately of his contact and the ultimate disposition of his problem.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI.

DATE: 1/16/48

FROM : SAC, New York.

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
ON AMERICAN VESSELS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Re Los Angeles letter 12/22/47.

The indices of this office reflect no record on [redacted] [redacted] RUC.

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmd
mc/sc

CC: San Francisco
Los Angeles

JFW:DJG

RECORDED & INDEXED
127

F B I
15 JAN 21 1948

392

359

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: December 31, 1947

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-16-81 BY 2842 PMC MC/JC

b7D

Reference is made to my letter of December 9, 1947 entitled [redacted] NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT", which was directed to the York Office with a copy to Chicago for their information in the case itle [redacted] Et Al, NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT". A copy of referenced letter is being enclosed herewith for the information of Bureau and the SACS at Miami and Philadelphia, and for the attention ssistant Director E. J. CONNELLEY at Chicago, in view of the fact that ay not have previously seen this communication.

There is also attached hereto for the information of all offices eiving this letter a copy of the New York reply letter dated December 20, 47 entitled "UNKNOWN SUBJECTS, Theft of Approximately $31,105 in Watches d Rings, March 14, 1947, New York City, Uris Sales Corporation, Victim, ATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT". In this connection, it is to be noted that [redacted] is a former bootlegger and has also engaged in the extensive eddling of counterfeit gasoline ration stamps during the past war. He as extensive criminal connections in various sections of the country, and as on a number of occasions within the past year furnished reliable information o this office concerning matters coming within our jurisdiction.

b7D

87-66615-15

This individual has only been arrested in Atlantic City on April 13, 1943 on a gas ration coupon charge for removal to Baltimore, but the case was understood to have later been nolle prossed.

DEFERRED RECORDING

[redacted] has today advised Special Agent MAURICE D. duBOIS of this office that he is willing to act as a confidential informant for this Bureau in endeavoring to obtain information from [redacted] and others who are engaged in criminal activities that will be of interest to this Bureau. It is believed very likely that he may be able to develop very pertinent information concerning large jewelry thefts and interstate transportations of same, if given an opportunity to act as a confidential informant of this Bureau in Philadelphia, New York City and Miami.

In this connection, it is to be noted that [redacted] is only willing to function on a strictly confidential basis and only if paid adequately to cover his expenses and slight amount extra. Itis to be noted also in this connection that he is presently recovering from a diabetes condition which had incapacitated him recently, and he now feels able to travel wherever it is necessary. He has indicated that [redacted] and his group are believed to be very extensive traffickers in stolen jewelry and are alleged by [redacted] to have connections in Los Angeles, Milwaukee, St. Louis and Miami, in addition to Chicago, Illinois.

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

RECORDED 66-7283-393

INDEXED 75 F B I

19 JAN 12 1948

7 1JAN 31 1948

Encl filed with copy

Director, FBI December 31, 1947

It is furthermore to be noted that the telephone number listed in my letter of December 9, 1947 mentioned above is the telephone number for [redacted] and is actually Michigan 4-1918. [redacted] according to this informant is presently ill in a hospital, probably in Philadelphia, and will be confined there for a period of about one week. b7D

In view of the fact that the Miami season is just beginning and the probability that reliable confidential informants in the criminal field are necessary down there, it is desired that the Bureau and interested offices advise whether the services of this informant are desired as noted above, and if so, what arrangements can be made with him concerning his remuneration. It is believed that this informant is well qualified to be of value to this Bureau and will be anxious to furnish information that will enable the Bureau to make some good cases. It is desired that an early answer be furnished in connection with this matter as it is anticipated that [redacted] will be pressing for an early reply as to whether his services are desired by this Bureau.

Ans in Butel to Baltimore 1-6-48 re Paul GABINO, NSPA

MDdB:KLS
66-New

cc: Chicago, Attention: Asst. Director E. J. CONNELLEY (Enc.)
New York (Enc.)
Miami (Enc.)
Philadelphia (Enc.)
Baltimore File 87-0-231

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pm JMC/JC

FEB 1 0 1981

66-2542-3-394
CHANGED TO
61-7565-813

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA; CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS -- The Communist Party is instituting a drive to obtain $1,000,000.00 which requires pledges equivalent to two weeks pay from each member. This is the latest attempt by the Communist Party to obtain money from its members. (U)

Informants who are rank and file members, when requested to make a donation, should not immediately acquiesce and pay the stipulated amount but should attempt to have the amount of the pledge reduced on the plea of necessity, personal reasons, poverty, or otherwise. In attempting to reduce any request, the informants may use the excuse of personal obligations, low income, rent, et cetera to indicate to the Party that the demand upon them by the Party is excessive. (U)

Informants who have an official status in the Party will, of course have to donate or pledge a sum larger than the amount requested of a rank and file member but any informant on such a higher level should also question, if possible, the amount of his pledge and not immediately hand over any money. (U)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 DMC/MCJC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91
7-16-81

SAC LETTER NO. 5
Series 1948
1-13-48

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 [illegible] ON 5-11-94 83-1343

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO CLASS 10/20/81 BMJ

CONFIDENTIAL

66-542-3

CONFIDENTIAL

In any event, all informants should attempt to pay any donation or pledge on an installment basis and in such a manner as to alleviate any possible suspicion.

No blanket authority is being given by the Bureau to pay the donations requested by the Party of our informants. Each office should advise the Bureau by teletype of the sum demanded of each informant, the action taken by the informant to reduce the amount, reaction by the Party to the protests of the informant, your recommendation in each instance and the reason therefor. Consideration will then be given by the Bureau to reimbursement of each informant and you will be advised by teletype. In offices having many informants, if possible, one teletype should be dispatched to the Bureau setting forth the required information on each informant. However, if a decision in regard to a particular informant is desired immediately, it is not necessary to accumulate data on all informants in each office but a teletype for the particular individual may be dispatched.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Attachment for (B)

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC LETTER NO. 5
Series 1948
1-13-48

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : E. A. TAMM

DATE: January 10, 1948

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: [redacted] INFORMANTS

Conf. Infts. in Genl. Intell. Work, Genl.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

b7D

Information which has been furnished by [redacted] informants in connection with the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Workers Party and Socialist Labor Party has in the past generally concerned Party memberships, Party meetings, the identities of those attending these meetings, social activities and the movement or transfer of members.

Inasmuch as these groups all have revolutionary aims and purposes it is felt that at this time it would be highly desirable for the individual [redacted] informants to be contacted and requested to make records of any statements which would show that it is the intent of the Party or Party member to overthrow the Government by force and violence. Any militant or revolutionary statement should be accurately recorded and furnished to this Bureau in a manner which would allow it to be used for possible evidentiary purposes.

In this connection [redacted] informants should also be instructed to obtain and properly identify Party literature which includes information concerning the militant and revolutionary nature of the Party concerned.

J. W. P.:mfs

RECORDED 66-2542-3-395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pm

EX-93

37 JAN 28 1948

59 FEB 4 1948

CARBON COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 5 1948

TELETYPE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF: Class DATE 10/20/81 CMT

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMD mc LOC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91
7-16-81

WASH 8 FROM NEW YORK 5 4-59 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 Cya/bip ON 5-11-94 83-1343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, IS-C. IN CONNECTION WITH THE CP FUND DRIVE TO OBTAIN ONE MILLION DOLLARS WHEREIN THE PARTY IS DEMANDING THE EQUIVALENT OF TWO WEEKS PAY FROM EACH MEMBER, IT IS FELT THAT A GREAT SUM OF MONEY WILL BE DEMANDED FROM TNHE BUREAU-S INFORMANTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. REFERENCE IS MADE TO MYTELS DATED ONE TWO FORTYEIGHT AND ONE FIVE FORTYEIGHT CONCERNING DONATIONS FOR INFORMANTS ND THREE FOUR TWO AND ND THREE EIGHT FOUR. SUTEL THE BUREAUS POLICY ON THIS MATTER FOR OUR FUTURE GUIDANCE. (U)

SCHEIDT

RECORDED 66-2542-3-396

50 JAN 28 1948

F B I

INITIALS CONFIDENTIAL

71 JAN 22 1948

Confidential Informants in General Intelligence World Gen

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-2

COPY: EMC

MR. E. A. TAMM 1/26/48

DIRECTOR

The following suggestion has been submitted to me by an employee of the Bureau and I should like to have it receive appropriate consideration:

Concerning the Loyalty Program it occurred to me that it might not be a bad idea for all Field Divisions to undertake a review of the Commie cases with the objective in view of uncovering the identity of former party members who have broken with the Party so that their names and addresses can be listed in the Informant or Source of Information Box in each office. As you know many former members of the Communist Party have completely broken with the Party and are cooperative in furnishing information about their previous associates in the Party. This review would be most helpful in making available for Agents who have not handled Commie cases reliable available sources of information. Hidden somewhere in a great many Commie files will be the identity of these people. A card could be prepared on each of these people showing his complete name, present address, the name of the branch of the Party he was affiliated with and the date he joined and left the Party. I think that this Loyalty Program is the most important activitiy of the Bureau and because it is so important we should handle these cases with great diligence and thoroughness. A deadline for handling these reviews might likewise be set. To have these readily available sources of information will make for the more expeditious and efficient handling of these cases.

CT:DSS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-16-81 BY 2842 SMD mc JC

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

RECORDED 397

EX-122

F B I

55 FEB 16 1948

ROUTINE

FEBRUARY 13, 1948

SACs: ~~ANCHORAGE~~ NR 131855
~~BOSTON~~ (3)
~~HOUSTON~~
~~LOUISVILLE~~
~~MIAMI~~
~~OMAHA~~
~~PITTSBURGH~~
~~RICHMOND~~
~~SPRINGFIELD~~

SEMI ANNUAL REPORT CNDIS. ADVISE WHEN REPORT SUBMITTED

BUREAU,

HOOVER

JDD:mpd

RECEIVED TELETYPE UNIT
FEB 13 1 29 PM '48
F.B.I. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Enc: mor

Sent to Co
2/13 at 1:30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY

RECORDED

166-2542-3-398
F B I
31 FEB 14 1948

2842pm
mc/JC EX-70

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1961

TELETYPE

FEB 13 1948

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

1 FEB 19 1948

Radio 2-13-48

4 08 pm
2 01 pm

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: February 5, 1948

FROM : J. P. COYNE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION TO REVIEW ALL CP FILES FOR POSSIBLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON LOYALTY PROGRAM

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2. DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum from the Director to Mr. E. A. Tamm dated January 26, 1948, in regard to a suggestion by a Bureau employee that all Field Division undertake a review of Communist cases to uncover the identity of disaffected Party members in order that their names and addresses can be listed in the informant or source of information box in each Office. The basis for this review allegedly is that former members are cooperative in furnishing information about their previous associates in the Party and this review would be helpful in making available for Agents who have not handled Communist cases reliable available sources of information. The suggestion further provides for a card to be prepared on each of these individuals showing complete name, present address, name of the branch of the Party with which he was affiliated, and the date he joined and left the Party. It was further suggested that a deadline be set for handling these reviews. By having these sources of information readily available, the Loyalty cases could be more expeditiously and efficiently handled. Communist Party files to be reviewed for possible sources of information

It is not believed that this suggestion should be followed for these reasons:

1. The Field is already burdened with a considerable amount of work and to request a file review of all Communist cases would not be worth the effort for the purposes indicated above. The fact that an individual has broken from the Party does not per se make him informant material. The Field is aware of the possibilities involved in contacting disaffected members of the Communist Party as evidenced every day on the informant desk. Through live informants and technical and microphone surveillances and trash covers, et cetera, it can be safely said that every Office is aware of the absolute necessity of contacting every available source of information to further our Communist investigations. One of the principal sources of possible informants has been and still is disaffected Party members.

Requests come in from the Field every day for Bureau permission to interview members of the Party who have shown a lack of interest or who have quit outright. Further, these disaffected Party members have not proven to be as good sources of information as one would think. They are for the most part rank and file members who do not know anything of value, who have never given anything but lip service to the Party and have fallen away. Interviews with this type

DECLASSIFIED BY ... ON 6-16-94 83-1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ... BY ROUTING ... (S) OF CIGS DATE 10/20/81 BMT

FBI 15 FEB 13 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

52 FEB 21 1948

Exec. Conf. Memo 2-10-48 HBF

CONFIDENTIAL

of individual have not been proven very productive. It has been possible to obtain informants in this manner but not in a sufficient number or quality to warrant a wholesale review of all Communist files in the Field.

2. As stated above, it does not appear that the results of this tremendous project will be worth the effort and inaddition the flat statement that these disaffected Party members are cooperative may be disputed. In some cases the disaffected Party member will talk but, as previously stated, his information is of little value and it has been found that a good many will not talk at all.

3. In connection with the suggestion, it is averred that hidden somewhere in a great many Communist files will be the identity of these disaffected Party members. It may be that these names are hidden in files without having received any attention but the Field has been told time and time again of the necessity to obtain and maintain informants and since disaffected Party members have been a lucrative source, the hiding away of any potential informants would indicate a lack of supervision by the SAC in the handling of Communist matters.

4. The listing in an index, as suggested, of the disaffected Party members for ready reference of all Agents not familiar with Communist activities is, in the first place, a violation of present Bureau instructions. It is incumbent upon the Field before contacting any individual as an informant on Communist matters to make a discreet background check which must be furnished to the Bureau for additional file search here and consideration by the Bureau as to the advisability of making a contact. This suggestion would overlook all this preliminary work and have any Agent not conversant with Communist matters indiscriminately contacting individuals as possible informants on Communist matters.

5. Setting up this index in connection with the suggestion appears to be another burden on the Field and it has been found that the use of indices is over done. It is not felt, therefore, that another index, such as proposed, should be set up for possible sources of information just for this one particular purpose. The inspectors in their inspections of the Field Offices and also the Seat of Government in the handling of the informant problem have stressed the necessity of maintaining informant indices in a current and workable manner. To do so, each informant

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

be carefully selected before his name is placed into the index. To haphazardly put a lot of names in a special index on informants would mean the setting up of another index to cross reference these informants on the Loyalty Program with the main index on confidential informants. Considerable confusion can result.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Field has been instructed many times and is carefully followed in individual informant matters to be on the lookout to obtain and maintain informants, contacts, and sources of information not only on Communist matters but on all of our investigative work. It is not believed desirable to initiate a project at this time, in view of our personnel situation, which would require a review of all Communist cases in all Field Offices for disaffected Party members with the vague hope that some of them may be able to furnish some information on Communism. It is not believed desirable to set up another index which would consist of a lot of names without taking into consideration the necessity of properly evaluating the merits of a contact with any of these persons. It is, therefore, suggested that no action be taken with regard to the suggestion in referenced memorandum.

JDD:lf

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: February 10, 1948

FROM : EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION TO REVIEW ALL CP FILES FOR POSSIBLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON LOYALTY PROGRAM

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

At a meeting of the Executive Conference on February 9, 1948, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Glavin, Harbo, Mohr, Clegg, Nichols, Rosen, Nease and Fletcher, a suggestion which had been made to you to review all Communist Party files in the various field offices for possible sources of information was discussed. The suggestion was to instruct all field offices to undertake a review of Communist cases to uncover the identity of disaffected Party members in order that their names and addresses could be listed in the informant or source box in each office.

It was unanimously agreed that this suggestion should not be presently followed for these reasons:

1. The field has from time to time been specifically instructed to be alert to the possibilities of the development of informants and sources of information on Communist matters.

2. The suggestion would impose a considerable burden on the field offices to assign some of their personnel to what constitutes actually a project.

3. It would create another index of the Bureau field offices of unknown value.

4. The correspondence from the field clearly indicates that they are alert to taking advantage of disaffections as they become known on a current basis.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

E. A. Tamm

cc - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

HBF:cmw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-16-81 BY 2802 RMC/JC

66-2542-3-400

F B I
15 FEB 13 1948

52 FEB 21 1948

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-12-2014

F65M72K70

URGENT
CODE (U)

FEBRUARY 14, 1948 (U)

SAC - BALTIMORE

CONFIDENTIAL

66-25442-3-401

RECORDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS, CP-USA, DISTRICT FOUR, IS

EX-58

REURTEL FEBRUARY ELEVEN LAST. AUTHORITY GIVEN MAKE

(U) FOLLOWING REIMBURSEMENTS: [redacted] b7D

[redacted] (U)

HOOVER

JDD:mpd

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-8-94

6-1-93
Classified by 9803PDD/bjs
Declassify on: OADR

0115-0125

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-4.2
DATE OF INSPECTION FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE SHOWN

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

TELETYPE

FEB 14 1948

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

9:52 PM

CONFIDENTIAL (U)

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Mohr
Pennington
Quinn Tamm
Nease
Candy

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2642 pmd mcfsc
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91 / 7-16-81

FEB 11 1948

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

WA 6 FROM BA 11 3-58 PM

DIRECTOR U R G E N T

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, DISTRICT FOUR. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. RE SAC LETTER FIVE, JANUARY THIRTEEN LAST. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT EIGHT [redacted] WAS REQUESTED FOR ONE WEEKS SALARY WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO [redacted] HE ADVISED CP OF HIGH TAXES, HIGH MEDICAL AND PERSONAL EXPENSES. HE FINALLY AGREED TO PAY [redacted] IN INSTALLMENTS DURING FEBRUARY. THIS PLEDGE WAS ACCEPTED RELUCTANTLY BY CP. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO GIVE INFORMANT THE SUM OF [redacted] IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN HIS POSITION IN THE GOOD GRACES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. (U)

DECLASSIFIED BY 8b6 Eya/Eya
ON 6-16-97

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted] PLEDGED [redacted], THE LOWEST AMOUNT PLEDGED BY ANY OF [redacted] THE OTHERS PLEDGING FROM TWENTYFIVE TO THIRTYFIVE DOLLARS. INFORMANT USED THE EXCUSE OF LOW INCOME AND PERSONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THE LOWER AMOUNT OF HIS PLEDGE. THE PLEDGE WAS ACCEPTED WITH THE REQUEST THAT INFORMANT INCREASE SAME IN THE EVENT HE FOUND THAT HE COULD DO SO. INFORMANT HAS NOT PLAID ANY OF HIS PLEDGE TO DATE AND CONTEMPLATES PAYING BUT HALF OF SAME. THIS OFFICE RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUM OF [redacted] BE AUTHORIZED FOR THIS INFORMANT FOR, ALTHOUGH HE IS A NEW MEMBER OF THE PARTY, HE HAS BEEN ATTENDING [redacted] AND WAS ELECTED [redacted] FEBRUARY NINE LAST. THIS AMOUNT IS RECOMMENDED IN ORDER FOR INFORMANT TO MAINTAIN ~~HIS~~ HIS POSITION IN THE PARTY AND TO AVOID ANY CRITICISM OR SUSPICION OF HIS ACTIVITIES. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND (U)

INDEXED 96

37 FEB 18 1948

EX-58

CONFIDENTIAL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-371936

Confidential National Defense Information

CONFI [redacted] b7D

THAT THIS INFORMANT IS PRESENTLY BEING PAID AT THE RATE OF [redacted] HOWEVER, A RECOMMENDATION IS BEING FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU THAT THIS BE INCREASED TO TEN DOLLARS PER WEEK. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted], WHO SUPPLIES MATERIAL FROM COMMUNIST PARTY HEADQUARTERS TO THIS OFFICE, CURRENTLY [redacted] WITHOUT BEING PAID BY THE PARTY. LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY FUNCTIONARIES HAVE INDICATED THAT THIS WORK WILL BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF A MONETARY CONTRIBUTION SINCE INFORMANT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PAID BY THEM FOR HIS [redacted] PARTY INTENDS TO RESUME PAYING INFORMANT WHEN FINANCES IMPROVE. NO RECOMMENDATION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF CI [redacted] IS BEING MADE AT THIS TIME. (U)

b7D

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted] PLEDGE TWELVE DOLLARS TO THE FUND DRIVE. HE WAS REQUESTED TO GIVE A WEEKS SALARY OF FORTY DOLLARS WHICH HE ADVISED HE COULD NOT DO INASMUCH AS HE HAS RECENTLY HAD HOSPITAL BILLS FOR BOTH [redacted] DUE TO THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE PARTY AGREED TO ACCEPT THIS REDUCED AMOUNT AND REQUESTED THAT HE INCREASE THE AMOUNT IF HE FOUND THAT HE AS ABLE TO DO SO. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE FULL AMOUNT OF [redacted] BE AUTHORIZED BY THE BUREAU FOR THIS INFORMANT INASMUCH AS HE IS FINANCIALLY UNABLE TO PAY THIS AMOUNT OF MONEY, AND BEING A PARTY MEMBER FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, HE WILL BE EXPECTED TO FURNISH AT LEAST [redacted] (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

HALLFORD

[redacted]

END

BA R 6 WA

cc: Mr. Donohue

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2542pmd mc
JC

66-2542-3-402

CHANGED TO

100-365248-X32

OCT 16 1950
Eft

C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-16-81 BY 28420mc
mc/jc

J.S.- 66-2542-3-403

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-50-1008X

COPY: EMC

TO : Mr. Tolson DATE: February 5, 1948

FROM : W. R. Clavin

SUBJECT: UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY APPEARING IN THE "DAILY IOWAN" ON JANUARY 23, 24, and 25th, 1948, CAPTIONED "THE GESTAPO COMES TO IOWA CITY."

Reference is made to Mr. Edwards' memorandum to me of February 4, 1948, concerning the a bove-mentioned matter. With reference to the Director's inquiry noted on the memorandum in question concerning Bureau instructions which have been issued in connection with school contacts, I am attaching hereto a copy of SAC Letter Number 152, Series 1947, dated November 24, 1947, pertaining to the development of informants. This communication was forwarded to all field offices. It will be noted that the first paragraph of the communication discusses a situation which recently developed wherein a college student, during a discussion with a Special Agent of the Bureau, was asked if there were any subversive organizations on the campus of the college. The bulletin goes on to point out that the student was irresponsible, had a detective complex and subsequently discussed this matter with a professor of the college in such a manner as to give the impression that he was being utilized as an undercover operative by the FBI to report actions and expressions of the faculty and students concerning Communist activities.

The communication further points out that it should be very obvious to all SACs that such a program on the part of the Bureau to indiscriminately develop informants among college students in the manner indicated would reflect on the Bureau and would subject the Bureau to considerable embarrassment and criticism. The bulletin, in two paragraphs, states as follows:

> "I desire to call to your attention the imperative necessity of abiding very carefully by Bur au instructions concerning the development of informants and that in initial contacts with anyone considered as a possible informant no information be discussed tending toward the development of security information. In other words, before potential informants are approached along those lines, their backgrounds and complete information concerning them should first be obtained so that an adequate knowledge concerning the reliability of the person being considered will be definitely known before an approach to obtain security information is made.
>
> "It is imperative that Spedial Agents in Charge carefully supervise the work of Special Agents in the development of informants to definitely eliminate the possibility

CONF. INFT.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-16-81 BY 2842 DMC MC/JC

404

F B I
76 MAR 5 1948

WRG:lrd

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 8

60 MAR 13 1948 14/7

of the Bureau using irresponsible persons as informants in any capacity or in any degree. As a general proposition, I consider it highly undesirable to use students as informants in view of their immaturity and their general lack of appreciation of the problems with which the Bureau is confronted. As you have been previously instructed, before any individual, and this, of course, would apply particularly to students, is approached with the idea in mind of developing into a confidential informant for the purpose of obtaining security information, complete background data should be obtained and such data transmitted to the Bureau."

In the present case, it is not felt that there was any attempt to develop an informant at the University of Iowa. A check on the American Youth for Democracy branch at the University of Iowa was a regular check made to keep abreast of the activities of the organizations on the campus. It was known to the Special Agent and to the Agent in Charge at Omaha that the "Daily Iowan," a campus newspaper, had a running morgue on this organization. The Special Agent, in making his contact, made it for the sole purpose of reviewing the newspaper morgue and for nothing further. Had he not reviewed the information in the newspaper morgue and if he were to handle this assignment to bring the files of the Omaha Office on this particular chapter of the American Youth for Democracy organization up to date, it would have been necessary for him to make personal inquiries on and, possibly, off of the campus which inquiries may have resulted in a greater embarrassment to the Bureau. The only alternative would be to make no inquiries whatsoever, since it is entirely possible that anyone on the campus, a professor, another official, or another individual, might publicize such inquiries made of him.

We had used this morgue before when another individual was the reporter contact. Before our Special Agent contacted Mr. Henry, the present reporter who took our former contact's place, he checked the reliability of Henry with the Chief of Police of Iowa City, a National Academy Graduate, and with the Public Relations Director at the University, both of w om okayed the Agent's contacting Henry, stating that he was a smart, dependable young reporter.

It is not felt that either SAC Dalton of the Omaha Division or SA Ambrose Nicholas Strittmatter, the Special Agent who handled this inquiry, violated Bureau instructions contained in the SAC letter of November 24, 1947.

The Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Rosen, Clegg, Fletcher, Nease, McGuire and Mohr considered the general overall problem as presented in connection with the coverage of Communist Party and Communist front group activities on the campuses of colleges and universities.

It was the opinion of the Conference that the Special Agent who conducted the investigation on the campus of Iowa University had used good judgment in making a preliminary contact before endeavoring to review the newspaper morgue of the "Daily Iowan." The Conference considered the advisability of discontinuing entirely our coverage of Communist Party and Communist Party front organization activities on college and university campuses with the thought in mind that such contacts would generally result in criticism being leveled at the Bureau and that the activities of such organizations could be followed on a national scale without endeavoring to try to identify the leaders on the various campuses and the individuals actively participating in such subversive groups. The American Youth for Democracy, of course, is the most active group in which we are interested on a nation-wide basis but there are other groups, for instance the American Veterans Committee, which is active on some campuses and which has been successfully penetrated by the Communists.

Mr. E. A. Tamm pointed out that G-2 of the Army was very much interested in the Communist Party and Communist front group activities on the various campuses of colleges and universities for the reason that there are reserve components of the Army on many of the campuses and the Army consequently would be interested in knowing whether any of their reserve officers are actively engaging in subversive activities. Mr. Tamm also pointed out that in many of the colleges there are a number of reserve officers who are students and the Army is likewise interested in following their activities as a general proposition. Likewise on some campuses there are certain secret installations and projects undertaken for the branches of the armed forces and on these campuses it would be desirable to know the type of subversive activity being conducted not only as to faculty members but also as to the Army trying to obtain coverage on the various college and university campuses in connection with subversive activities among students. Mr. Tamm felt, therefore, that we could not at this time logically discontinue our national coverage of the Communist Party and Communist front groups on the campuses of universities and colleges.

Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Harbo, Rosen, Clegg, Nease and Mohr recommend the following program for coverage on college and university campuses with respect to Communist Party and Communist front activities:

1. No contact be made with students.

2. Contacts on the campuses be restricted to established, reliable college and university officials.

3. Special Agents conducting such investigations preferably rely on non-student, outside reliable sources.

4. Investigating Agents endeavor to obtain discreetly copies of school papers and publications which describe organizational activity on the campuses.

These members of the Conference felt that if such instructions are issued to the field - that criticism of the Bureau's investigations on college and university campuses will be drastically curtailed and possibly eliminated. If the Director agrees with the majority of the Conference, the necessary SAC Letter

will be sent to the field embodying the foregoing instructions.

Messrs. Olavin, Tracy, Fletcher and McGuire did not agree with the majority of the Conference because they felt that the instructions agreed upon by the majority would not solve the problem of future criticism of the Bureau's activities in conducting investigations of Communist Party and Communist front group activities on college and university campuses and they felt that investigating Agents should be permitted to contact students whom they know to be reliable and sufficiently mature to maintain such contacts in confidence. These members of the Conference feel that no change should be made in present Bureau instructions other than to advise the Special Agents in Charge that investigating Agents should endeavor to rely upon students of known reliability in making their contacts and conducting subversive investigations on campuses of colleges and universities.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

I agree with majority. I note Tamm's views on P. 3 and am not clear. I thought we gave to Army all authority to investigate reserve officers and applicants for reserve. Am I in error?

Clyde Tolson

E. A. Tamm

H.

JPM:DW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-16-84 BY 2842 pmd mc/JC

(B) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS -- Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 152, Series 1947, dated November 24, 1947, concerning a situation wherein criticism was leveled at the Bureau due to a contact with an irresponsible, immature individual on a college campus. The student in question was not developed as an informant but the discussion which was had with him by the Special Agent was carried to a professor in such a manner as to give a wrong impression and resulted in considerable embarrassment to the Bureau. You were advised to carefully scrutinize the informant program in your division and to be extremely careful in not only developing informants, but also in discussions with individuals on security matters.

Another situation has arisen as a result of a contact made by a Special Agent on the campus of a midwest university. The contact was for a legitimate reason in the coverage of subversive activity but became the cause of several articles in a campus paper in which an elaborate misconstruction was placed upon the contact, in fact, the Bureau was accused of being a "Gestapo."

Consideration has been given to the problem of adequately discharging our responsibilities in regard to subversive activity on college campuses in such a manner as to avoid additional unfavorable reflection. In order to properly follow subversive activities, particularly as they apply to youth organizations, it is necessary that our investigations be diligently pursued but at the same time definite action must be taken to prevent any further embarrassment. Effective immediately, therefore, in connection with your coverage of college and university campuses with respect to Communist Party and Communist front activities and subversive activity generally, no contact is to be made in the future with students. If you now have informants, contacts or sources of information who are students, a communication should be directed to the Bureau in regard to each one who you feel is mature, reliable and trustworthy and who, in your opinion, should be retained in his present status. In addition to background data and an analysis of his value, you should also set forth your recommendation. A review will be made by the Bureau of the information which you submit on each person and you will be advised as to whether or not he should be continued.

In conducting these investigations, reliance should first be placed on non-student outside sources. If necessary, contacts may be made on the campuses, but restricted to established, reliable college or university officials. Students should be utilized only when approved by the Bureau. It is appreciated that at times it is necessary to obtain school publications but you should endeavor to obtain such school papers and publications which describe organizational activity on the campus in a discreet and indirect manner.

I wish to again emphasize the necessity of maintaining close personal touch with the entire informant program in your office. Criticism such as the Bureau has recently experienced due to our investigative activity on college campuses was the result of necessary contacts, but I desire, particularly in connection with informants and other functions of your office, that you be most circumspect to prevent such criticism in the future.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

52 MAR 3 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmd mc/JC

66-2542-3-405
CHANGED TO
66-2542-3-6-713

146

b7D

[redacted]

Please forward this letter to
F. B. I. Office Boston, Mass.

Truly yours,

[redacted]

P.S. Am leaving for Europe this April.
Will keep in touch with you
somehow.

b7D

Boston, Mass.
Feb. 28, 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmd
mc/JC

Mr. Smith
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Some time ago I brought you a report concerning communist activity in the U.S. Merchant Marine in Norfolk, Va.

Since then I have been forced to take a different course of action. Even the President of the U.S. thinks I am a communist. Nevertheless I am now on the inside track of the very heart of communist activity and authority.

They are building a net around

RECORDED
66-2542-3-406
F B I
29 MAR 17 1948

CONF. INFT. Intelligence Work - General

cc Boston 3/14/48 [illegible]

RECEIVED
R 4 3 29 PM
INTERNAL SECURITY
F.B.I.

SAC, Boston

March 12, 1948

Director, FBI

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 DMH MC/JC

b7D

RECORDED & INDEXED

POTENTIAL INFORMANT - MARITIME MATTERS; INTERNAL SECURITY - C

66-2542-3-406

Enclosed herewith are two photostatic copies of a letter received at the Bureau from one [redacted], of [redacted] Boston, Massachusetts, dated February 28, 1948, and postmarked March 1, 1948 at Boston. It is noted that the writer addressed this letter to a Mr. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C., but requested that this letter be forwarded to the Boston FBI Office.

Bureau files contain no such reports as [redacted] refers to in his letter. A check of the Bureau files revealed no references that are completely identifiable with the writer of enclosed letter. There is set out below, for your possible assistance, information from Bureau files that may possibly identify the captioned individual or a member of his family.

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent R. G. Flynn dated July 3, 1941 at Boston, your file 100-1121, entitled [redacted] Internal Security - I" wherein mention is made of a [redacted] as possibly being the son of the subject of referenced Boston report. [redacted] of the subject of that file, was an alien enemy. (100-32434-1)

b7D

Further reference is made to a [redacted] in a Boston letter to the Bureau dated January 15, 1941 entitled "Italian Activities in the United States: Internal Security - I". This reference reported that [redacted] at [redacted] Winthrop, Massachusetts. (61-7602-6)

On April 13, 1942, Censorship daily report, copy 174, volume #4426-4445, in Bureau files lists a [redacted] Winthrop, Massachusetts, as reported to be the [redacted] and very active as well in other Fascist movements. (62-62736-1008)

You are instructed to check your indices and files for a possible record or identification of captioned individual. If he is not already known to your office, you are requested to contact him and orally acknowledge his letter and at that time obtain any such information he has that is of interest to the Bureau. This matter should be given early attention inasmuch as Spano indicated in his letter that he was leaving for Europe in April.

Enclosures

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 8
MAR 1 1948 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

56 MAR 2 99

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: March 13, 1948

FROM : SAC, Denver

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS In General Intelligence

Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 32 dated February 25, 1948, which requested advice as to informants utilized by this office who are students.

I wish to advise that this office has no such informants. We have made arrangements at the campuses at the major schools located in this territory to obtain information with respect to possible subversive activity on these campuses through other sources. In most instances we obtain information from students directly through third parties who are not students. The students are not aware that information they furnish to these third persons is being made available to the Bureau.

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

RPK:ic
66-40

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY [illegible]

HANDLED BY
TOP DESK

W

RECORDED 66-2542-3-4071
F B I
31 MAR 19 1948

59 MAR 26 1948
146

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, FBI

DATE: March 31, 1948

FROM SAC, Charlotte ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS ON CRIMINAL MATTERS

In conformity with SAC Letter No. 47, dated April 30, 1946, this is to advise that no additional informants have been developed in the Charlotte Division during the month of March, 1948.

66-333-C
JCM:evi

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC
ON 7-16-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY SLIP OF DATE 10/20/81 Class OMT

RECORDED 28

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

166-2542-3-408
F B I

37 APR 8 1948

EX-46

6 0 APR 14 1948

146

SAC, Washington Field

November 21, 1947

Director, FBI

[redacted]

b7D

LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
COGOG

Reurlet 11-18-47, advising that [redacted] an employee of the Treasury Department, has admitted to agents of the Secret Service that he is a member of the Communist Party and there is strong likelihood that he will be discharged from Treasury in the near future because of this fact.

In view of the difficulties which must be encountered in handling the investigation of Federal employees under the Loyalty Program, it will be necessary to not only enlist the cooperation of Secret Service and higher officials in Treasury but undoubtedly the Civil Service Commission. No affirmative action should be taken by your office to make an informant of [redacted] as long as he is employed by Treasury. You should, however, keep a discreet check on the situation as regards [redacted] and when he is discharged further discreet inquiries concerning his background should be made if necessary to ascertain his connection with any other organizations of a subversive nature. The results of your inquiries, together with the conclusions and the report of Treasury on [redacted] should be made known to the Bureau for consideration as to whether an affirmative step should be taken to attempt to make an informant of [redacted]

Any views, comments or suggestions which you or the Agents in your office handling COGOG and Communist matters may care to make in regard to Sherman should also be set forth in this memorandum to the Bureau.

JED:LH

MAIL ROOM 1947 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SAC, Washington Field

November 21, 1947

Director, FBI

[redacted]

b7D

LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
COGOG

Reurlet 11-18-47, advising that [redacted] an employee of the Treasury Department, has admitted to agents of the Secret Service that he is a member of the Communist Party and there is strong likelihood that he will be discharged from Treasury in the near future because of this fact.

In view of the difficulties which must be encountered in handling the investigation of Federal employees under the Loyalty Program, it will be necessary to not only enlist the cooperation of Secret Service and higher officials in Treasury but undoubtedly the Civil Service Commission. No affirmative action should be taken by your office to make an informant of [redacted] as long as he is employed by Treasury. You should, however, keep a discreet check on the situation as regards [redacted] and when he is discharged further discreet inquiries concerning his background should be made if necessary to ascertain his connection with any other organizations of a subversive nature. The results of your inquiries, together with the conclusions and the report of Treasury on [redacted] should be made known to the Bureau for consideration as to whether an affirmative step should be taken to attempt to make an informant o[redacted]

Any views, comments or suggestions which you or the Agents in your office handling COGOG and Communist matters may care to make in regard to Sherman should also be set forth in this memorandum to the Bureau.

JDD:LH

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 4
NOV 2 1947 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECORDED 66-754v-3-409

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. E. A. Tamm

DATE: November 20, 1947

FROM : Mr. D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: [redacted]
COGOG;
INFORMANTS UNDER LOYALTY PROGRAM

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b7D

b7D

The Washington Field has learned that one [redacted], an employee of the Treasury Department, has been the subject of a personnel investigation within the last few weeks which uncovered information indicating that he might be a Communist. According to Agent Tom Kelly of Secret Service, who was contacted in this matter, [redacted] was interrogated and admitted being a member of the Communist Party for a period of some two months. There was no indication, according to Kelly, that [redacted] had ever engaged in espionage activities and copies of the report on him will be turned over to the Bureau within a few weeks. The suggestion was made by Washington Field that consideration be given to utilizing [redacted] as an informant in view of his admitted membership in the Party while being employed in the Treasury Department. It was suggested that this matter be handled quickly as it is likely [redacted] ill be discharged at any time. Certain steps were set forth by Washington Field which could be the means of using [redacted] as a source of information in the Communist Party Government group, particularly members in the Treasury Department which would necessitate the contacting of Secret Service as to our activity. It probably also would be necessary to enter an agreement with Treasury that [redacted] would not be discharged until he were developed as an informant. Mr. Kelly already has stated that there is no doubt [redacted] will be discharged from Treasury by one means or another. After obtaining an agreement with Treasury, [redacted] would, of course, have to be contacted and his possible discharge from employment pointed out to him as well as the advantage of cooperating with the Government. There is no present indication that [redacted] would cooperate but it was pointed out by Washington Field that the mere loss of his job would constitute an economic hardship and might be sufficient to turn [redacted] into an informant.

It is not believed that any affirmative steps should be taken to develop [redacted] as a confidential informant in view of the difficulties with which we would be confronted in obtaining the assistance of Secret Service and high officials of the Treasury Department, which knowledge might be used to our detriment. Under the old Hatch Act program we were able to defer individual investigations of Government employees who were cooperating with us in furnishing information which was of assistance in other investigations of the same type. Clearance for this policy was obtained from the Attorney General on June 16, 1942, in reply to our memorandum of June 8, 1942. The individuals of particular concern at that time were former informants [redacted] and [redacted] who were assisting the Washington Field office.

An informant in Treasury and other Government agencies would be most desirable as information concerning membership in the Government on the part of Communists is lacking due no doubt to the extreme secrecy surrounding the membership and its activity. There are many difficulties confronting us, however, in placing informants in the Government under the Loyalty Program. As mentioned above, the Bureau had some control over the individual investigations under the old Hatch Act

JDD:LH

but under the Loyalty Program if the Civil Service requests an investigation to determine whether a person comes under Part V, Section 1, (f), such an investigation must be undertaken and the employing agency is aware of this. It also is understood that a check is made of us concerning the progress of this requested inquiry. The subsection (f), mentioned above, pertains to "membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association .....designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive....." It would be necessary, therefore, to not only have some approval from the Attorney General or, at least, give him some knowledge of our holding any investigation in abeyance concerning a Government employee who was cooperating with us but it would also be necessary to have some agreement with Civil Service and probably the employing agency to defer an inquiry. This would be practically impossible to handle on a confidential basis, as well as being cumbersome, and we are, therefore, faced with the necessity of conducting an investigation of an informant in the Federal Government if we attempt to use such an individual. No affirmative steps, therefore, are possible in gaining informant coverage in the different Government departments unless particular individuals come forward and voluntarily furnish this assistance.

RECOMMENDATION

1) There is attached for your approval a memorandum to Washington Field advising that no affirmative steps should be taken to attempt to make Meyer Sherman a confidential informant. At the same time the Washington Field is being advised to keep track of the employment of [redacted] and when he is dismissed, as soon as possible additional inquiries be made of a discreet nature to determine whether at that time he may not be interviewed as informant material. No interview is to be conducted, however, without first furnishing the Bureau the results of the Treasury investigation, together with additional discreet checks on [redacted] and an opinion by the SAC as to the advisability and possible success of an interview. b7D

2) In view of the practically insurmountable difficulties with which we are confronted under the Loyalty Program, no attempt should be made at this time to establish a policy of obtaining informants in the Government agencies. On the other hand, if any field office submits the name of a possible informant requiring no affirmative action on our part but merely the acceptance of information from the individual, such should be accepted if the circumstances of each individual case indicate no possible embarrassment to the Bureau.

3) Under Recommendation #2 it was stated that we could accept informants who volunteer their assistance but if any field office submits the name of a possible informant requiring action on the part of the field in developing or encouraging an individual, it is further recommended that generally approval not be given. Two fairly recent examples handled by the informant desk of this

type involved a Bureau of Prison guard at the Atlanta penitentiary, a member of the UFWA, in which case Atlanta was advised to take no steps in developing him as an informant but any information which he volunteered should be accepted. The other case involved an employee of War Assets Administration in Honolulu who appeared at that office and admitted being a former member of the Communist Party. Honolulu was advised to take no affirmative steps towards making an informant in view of his employment and an additional reason was the fact that he had been investigated by the Bureau in the past under the Hatch Act.

Attachment

SAC, New York

Confidential

February 4, 1948

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN GEN'L INTELLIGENCE WORK
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
Internal Security - C

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 PMD MCJ JC

b7D

Reurlet January 21, 1948, in which you advised that the physical surveillance requested by the Bureau on [redacted] had been completed and the results thereof set forth in the report of Special Agent John M. Collins dated January 6, 1948, at New York City in the case of [redacted] Internal Security - C.

A review of this report does not indicate that details of the activity of [redacted] were set forth in a manner similar to the reports of surveillances on [redacted] You are requested to review the surveillance logs of the ten day surveillance conducted on [redacted] and submit to the Bureau details of the daily routine of [redacted] such as:

Average time when he left his residence for Communist Party headquarters;

Manner of daily travel such as subway, taxi, or by walking; if he walked, the usual streets which he used;

Any places which he may have frequented such as newspaper stands, cigar stores, or the like;

Any particular restaurant or restaurants which he frequented for breakfast, lunch, or dinner;

Any other item of interest on Johnson's habits which could be used as an avenue of approach, which approach would be made to him when he is alone and in the course of his regular routine.

For example, it may be deemed desirable to make a contact with [redacted] in a casual manner in a favorite eating place or in the course of his regular travel to or from work or at some public meeting.

b7D

The results of your check of the surveillance logs as above requested should be transmitted to the Bureau as soon as possible.

G.I.R.-6

FEB 5 1 37 PM '48

100-12583-41

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 11
☆ FEB 5 1948 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

166-2542-3-410

RECORDED & INDEXED

EX-84

APR 6 1948

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

JDD:mn

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-12-2014

AL BUREAU OF INVES
STATES DEPARTMENT

CC-150

F65M72K70

CONFIDENTIAL

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to: APRIL 16, 1948 (U)

SAC, NEW YORK
LOS ANGELES

TELETYPE - URGENT - CODED (U)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. ADVISE IMMEDIATELY IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMANTS LATIN DESCENT WHO WOULD BE TRUSTWORTHY, CAPABLE, AND WILLING PROCEED CUBA UNDER COVER FOR PURPOSE ATTEMPTED PENETRATION COMMUNIST PARTY OR COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS. NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN EXCEPT ADVISE BUREAU YOUR RECOMMENDATION. (U)

HOOVER

VPK:mrl

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2542 pm/mrt
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1.3.2 2.3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-81
7-16-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FILES ADVISED SERIAL DATE 10/20/81 BMS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 6-8-94

6-1-93 9803020/bis
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Kerbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Lease
Miss Jandt

RECORDED
INDEXED
APR 15 PM 2:48
APR 16 9 42 PM
RECEIVED BUREAU-DIRECTOR
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
APR 20 1948

TELETYPE

APR 16 1948 (U)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SENT VIA

10 00 P M Per

EX-59

CONFIDENTIAL (U)

MAY 3-1948

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 20, 1948

FROM : SAC, Boston

Confidential Informants in General Intelligence Work - General -

SUBJECT: [redacted]
POTENTIAL INFORMANT -
MARITIME MATTERS;
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

66-2542-3-406.

Pursuant to instructions contained in Bureau letter dated March 12, 1948, [redacted] was interviewed and receipt of his letter to the Bureau was acknowledged at that time.

From information developed during interview with this individual, it is believed that he possesses no information of value to the Bureau nor will he be placed in a position offering such assistance in the future.

Regarding his leaving for Europe, he stated that it was his desire to obtain a job with a new service in Rome, Italy, doing translation work but that no definite arrangements had yet been initiated.

No further efforts will be made to contact SPANO.

LHB/jas
100-1121

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 28 [illegible] MCJC

See 66-2542-3-406

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-3-413
F B I
34 APR 23 1948

74

59 MAY 5 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pm mc JC

Evh 66-2542-3-414

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-44-336

COPY:AJH

April 21, 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PMD MC/JC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
LADD
CLEGG
HARBO

I have recently had called to my attention the following matters which I would like to have you carefully consider and submit your recommendations to me for possible further action:

1. Loyalty Program

In one divisional office, considerable success has been achieved in meeting the Bureau's deadlines in Loyalty of Government Employee cases by the Special Agent in Charge insisting that all deadlines be met. The observation was made that the setting of deadlines in these cases has increased the efficiency of the Agents in handling them in that it requires a constant drive on their part in planning their work a day in advance and in executing the plan in order to meet the deadlines. The newer Agents working on these cases are being given instructions daily in how to handle them and how to meet their problems. Each morning a conference is held for the Agents handling Loyalty of Government Employee cases, at which time the problems arising in connection with these cases are discussed, questions are answered, thus simplifying the supervision of these cases and enlarging the knowledge of the Agents by a sharing of the experience of each other in these cases.

2. Development of Informants

RECORDED 124 166-[illegible]-415

It has been suggested that the Loyalty Program offers many opportunities if properly exploited in the development of informants in Communist matters. In one office the procedure for alerting the Communist Squad to possible informants is to have the Agents working on Loyalty of Government Employee cases write a brief memorandum on possible informants so that the data concerning the possible informant can be assembled and a letter written to the Bureau requesting the necessary authority to proceed with the development of the informant. It is felt that since many new Agents are assigned to this type of investigation, their attention should be directed to this possibility as many former Communists are interviewed as well as people who have been approached by the Communists to join the Communist Party, with the result that such individuals may well be considered as possible sources of information and Bureau informants.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

71 MAY 7-1948

3. Development of Agents in the Handling of Technical Equipment

The observation has been made that in every office only a few if any Special Agents are fully qualified to handle sound equipment, to act with confidence with a camera, to make plaster casts, etc. While the Bureau's training program seeks to qualify Agents in these fields, it has been suggested that valuable results might be achieved by the preparation of a questionnaire to the field to discover which Agents among the field employees are particularly interested in such subjects so that additional instruction in the field and at the Seat of Government might be given to such employees. It has been further suggested that an Agent who is interested in sound work, for instance, should as in our Accountant's training program be assigned in the field under the supervision of the sound man in that particular office to make necessary installations and a report should be submitted to the Bureau on the development of such an employee setting forth the type of installations made and the problems encountered. It was felt that this should also apply to the use of the Photorecord camera where the set up and the time consumed in setting it up and dismantling it are of importance.

4. Firearms Training and the Handling of Bureau Weapons

The observation has been made that in recent months a lack of knowledge on the part of Agents in dismantling weapons has been noted. It was felt that the newer men should be further instructed along this line. The suggestion was made that in each field office for a period of six months, groups of Agents should be assembled under a firearms expert and given specific instructions in the care of firearms and each Agent so selected for this training should be given the assignment for several months each year to be responsible for the firearms in the office.

5. Internal Security Program - Communism

My attention has been called to the fact that when the Bureau first started inquiring into Communist activities, many of the cases were opened under 61 and 65 classifications. I have been informed that in many of these files valuable lists of Communists for the years 1939 to 1941 appear and that on many of these people no recent information is available in our files. A strong possibility exists that information relating to members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and persons trained in Communist schools in Russia might appear and that the names of many of these people would not appear in the presently segregated Communist indices. While it is true that most of the 65 classification cases would relate to German and Japanese matters, it was suggested that some consideration should now be given to a review of these files for the preparation of the Communist indices now being

set up in the field. It was felt that a review of these files in spite of the additional time and effort that might be required would be of value in disclosing members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, persons trained in Russian schools, sources of information such as former Communists who might be interviewed in Loyalty of Government Employee cases or in furnishing evidence in cases of Communists who might be taken into custody in the event of hostilities, possible informants, possible hideouts of Communists and leads for information as to the present membership of Communist Party branches in which there are presently no informants.

As I have indicated, I am desirous of having you give these suggestions and observations your immediate consideration and study in order that appropriate recommendations can be submitted to me for further consideration and action.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COPY:AJH

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR DATE: May 17, 1948

FROM : JOINT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 910
EMPLOYEE: INSPECTOR M. E. GURNEA SAVINGS: NONE
AWARD: NONE

MEMBERS PRESENT: R. T. HARBO
L. V. BOARDMAN
H. B. LONG
S. K. McKEE

SUGGESTION: That the present policy of segregating index cards on general investigative confidential informants from cards on confidential national defense informants be eliminated. At present each of these is treated as a separate group of cards, and within each group they are sub-divided first by geographic location and then are arranged in alphabetical sequence within each sub-division.

The Joint Committee felt that it makes little difference as to whether they are maintained separately as at present or are merged into a single file. Accordingly, it is the recommendation of the Joint Committee that no change be made.

JOINT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION: Unanimously unfavorable.

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION: Executive Conference 5/21/48 unanimously unfavorable. Present Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Glavin, Mohr, N. H. McCabe, Fletcher, Rosen, Nease and Harbo.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

E. A. Tamm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pm mc/JC

RTH:djb
CC: Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

RECORDED - 39
INDEXED : 39

66-2542-3-416

SERIAL COPY FILED IN 66-2542-11977

Copy;AJH

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. CLEGG DATE: May 6, 1948

FROM : M. E. GURNEA

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INDEX

It is the present policy to keep the index cards on security and general investigative informants in separate sections of the confidential informant index file. I can see that this serves no purpose. It is suggested that these cards be filed strictly on a geographical basis, irrespective of the type of information the informants may be expected to give. The number of confidential informants, of course, is not as great as the sources of information and I can see no reason why the consolidation would cause any confusion.

MEG:elk

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842 pm mc JC

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 39 66-2542-3-416

14 1948

SAC Letter # 77
5-15-48

°Confidential Informants In General Intelligence work - Gail

(B) INVESTIGATIONS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES -- Reference is made to SAC Letters No. 152 dated November 24, 1947, and No. 32 dated February 25, 1948, entitled "Confidential Informants," pointing out that various situations had developed which had placed the Bureau in embarrassing positions by reason of contacts made on college campuses.

Effective immediately, before any internal security type of investigations are conducted of students, faculty members or organizations on campuses of colleges or universities, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. Bureau authority shall also be obtained prior to conducting any interview with a student or faculty member concerning the subject of any type of internal security or security matter investigation, whether that subject be an individual or an organization.

Such authority shall be requested of the Bureau by letter setting forth in detail the reasons why you believe the investigation is necessary so that your request to conduct the investigation is fully substantiated. If time is of the essence, you should, of course, utilize the teletype or telephone whichever is most appropriate to convey your request for the necessary authority.

Bureau authority to conduct interviews at colleges and universities in applicant matters is not required. Applicant matters shall include such investigations as the Atomic Energy Act, applicant and employee, Loyalty of Government Employees, and similar types of investigations.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2542-76

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 DMD
MC/JC

166-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
55 MAY 27 1948

264
60 JUN 3 - 1948

Confidential Informants in General Intelligence Work - Gen'l

(B) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS - TRASH COVERS -- In the future trash received from confidential informants is not to be kept in Bureau space overnight. All trash received is to be processed and disposed of the same day. Processed trash which is retained for investigative or other purposes of the Bureau of course is not included within the provision that trash is to be disposed of the day received.

It is recognized that when trash is received, all types of material such as inflammable material or material which is easily the subject of spontaneous combustion may be included. It is recognized that the procedure outlined above will require some offices to alter present practices. Immediate steps should be taken to insure that the trash is disposed of in such a manner that it will not remain in Bureau space overnight. So far as the disposition of office trash is concerned all SAC's must insure that it is handled in such a manner to insure that no fire hazard is involved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pm DMC JC

P

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 65-44-779

66-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
87 JUN 21 1948

58 JUN 24 1948

COPY:AJH

(D) LOYALTY PROGRAM - CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS --

I. LOYALTY PROGRAM -- Reports reaching the Bureau indicate that the Bureau's insistence that deadlines be met in loyalty cases has had a most salutary effect. It has been observed that the meeting of these deadlines has resulted in increased efficiency on the part of the Agents in handling their assignments, in that it requires a constant drive on the part of the Agents in planning their work in advance and in executing their plans.

As you know, the Bureau has a tremendous responsibility under the Loyalty Program and it is absolutely imperative that we carry out this responsibility with dispatch and thoroughness.

In connection with the handling of loyalty cases, consideration should be given to frequent conferences in order to permit a discussion of problems arising, the answering of questions, and generally enlarging the knowledge of the Agents by a sharing of the experience of each other. Consideration should be given to holding brief conferences each morning with the Agents handling this type of case. In one divisional office where this practice has been instituted, it has been found beneficial not only to the Agents working on the cases but also has simplified the supervision on the part of those charged with this responsibility. It is realized, of course, that it is not possible to initiate daily conferences in some field offices where there are a large number of resident Agents and Agents on the road. However, it is suggested that where feasible, serious consideration should be given to this means of possible assistance in the handling of these cases.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMANTS -- In handling loyalty cases, we must be alert to the possibility of developing confidential informants in Communist an[illegible] general security matter. In those instances where an individual interviewed appears to be in possession of information concerning Communism or other gene[illegible] security matters, appropriate steps should be taken to arrange for subsequent contact with that person for the purpose of possible development of him as a[illegible] informant. One office has adopted the procedure of preparing a brief memora[illegible] reflecting sufficient identifying data on a potential informant to permit th[illegible] writing to the Bureau requesting necessary authority for the purpose of con[illegible] him and proceeding with attempts to develop him.

Care should be exercised in any endeavor along this line, since the Bureau does not desire that any criticism result from the handling of a loyalty case because of questions propounded of the witness during the time he is interviewed in the loyalty investigation.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

SAC LETTER NO. 73
Series 1948
5-8-48

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842

NOT RECORDED
46 MAY 18 1948

pmdmc/JC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI DATE: 6-10-48

FROM : SAC, Boston

SUBJECT: B-C BRANCH, AASCW
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Confidential Informants IN Gen'l Intelligence Work

Reference is made to Bureau SAC Letter #77, dated 5-15-48, and particularly to Section B thereof.

Bureau authority is requested to go upon the campi of Harvard College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to conduct investigation in these cases. It is noted that currently the Boston Division has informants in both organizations and that the greater bulk of the work will be done by these informants. However, it is occasionally necessary to visit record offices at these schools in order to obtain additional identifying data concerning the members. Moreover, it is occasionally necessary to have an Agent attend a public meeting sponsored by these organizations at institution halls.

It is not anticipated that any action will be taken which will in any way embarrass the Bureau.

BSG:ak
100-293

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-12-81 BY mc JC

RECORDED - 39 | 66-2542-3-417
F B I
5 JUN 12 1948

SAC, Boston

July 8, 1948

Director, FBI

BOSTON-CAMBRIDGE BRANCH
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Your file #100-2031
Bureau file #66-2542-3 417

RECORDED - 124

EX-46

Reurlet dated June 10, 1948, captioned as above requesting Bureau authority to conduct investigations at Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in connection with the above case. Your letter indicated that investigations in these schools would be limited to visits to record offices and attendances at public gatherings.

In accordance with your request, Bureau authority is hereby given to you to visit the record offices at Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and to attend public gatherings at these two schools when necessary to properly investigate the above case. However investigation of these schools must be handled with the utmost care and discretion in order that no embarrassment to the Bureau will result.

GHS:gas

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Mohr
Pennington
Quinn Tamm
Room
Nease
Candy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 9
JUL 9 1948 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pmd MC/JC

RECEIVED REAL NG ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
JUL 9 1 05 PM '48

344
JUL 20

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : E. A. TAMM

DATE: June 2, 1948

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS in Gen'l. Intell. Work - Gen'l.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Under date of October 21, 1947, SAC letter number 139 was issued directing all Special Agents in Charge to furnish an individual letter on each national defense informant setting out the informant's background and history, particularly of an organizational character. The reason for this SAC letter was that complete information concerning the activities of our informants, particularly on Communist matters, had not been transmitted to the Bureau in the past and in the preparation of the brief it was essential that we have at least as much information on our informants as was required by the Communist Party.

The letters which have been received in the Bureau have all been handled and new confidential informant cards made for the informant indices. However, a check has revealed that a considerable number of letters have not been furnished to the Bureau by the field.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached for approval a proposed letter to all Special Agents in Charge referenced to the previous SAC letter number 139 and directing that an individual communication be sent to the Bureau on each and every national defense informant setting forth background, organizational information and general historical data.

Enclosure

JDD:hls:dhv

RECORDED - 70

166-2542-3-418
F B I
31 JUN 23 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pm DMCJC

178

50 JUL 13 1948

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 90
Series 1948

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

June 12, 1948

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
	BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
	BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
	BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
	BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

RE: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 139, dated October 21, 1947, entitled "Communist Confidential Informants, Communist Party History" directing that each Communist informant be interviewed and his complete background and history in Party activities be obtained and submitted to the Bureau.

It was also stated that the interviews were not to be confined solely to Communist informants, but the same type of interrogation should be had of each and every national defense informant who was furnishing information of a subversive nature.

The letters submitted in response to SAC Letter No. 139 have now been processed and it has been noted that a considerable number have not been transmitted to the Bureau. You are requested to check immediately and determine whether an individual communication has been furnished to the Bureau regarding each and every national defense informant furnishing information of a subversive nature.

If an appropriate letter has not been submitted you should conduct any necessary interviews and furnish the information outlined in SAC letter No. 139 as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

166-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
71 JUN 21 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-12-81 BY 2842 [illegible]

MAILED DUPLICATE YELLOW

71 JUN 23 1948

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-780

Confidential Informants in General Intelligence Work Gen

FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: July 16, 1948

FROM : H. B. Fletcher

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY FIGURES AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 DMD NCJC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91
7-17-81

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Purpose

This memorandum has been prepared to set out the status of the project undertaken by the Seat of Government and the New York Division to ascertain whether any of the higher ranking Communists could be approached as possible informants. At one time two agents in New York worked on this project as a special and reviewed many possibilities, some of which were submitted to the Bureau for approval. It will also be recalled that the Executive Conference on September 29, 1947, recommended that if a good possibility was located, the approach be made through [redacted] in indirect manner. Of the individuals recommended, none have been approved by the Director and an approach by [redacted] has not been made up to this time to any of the individuals considered as informant material. (U)

b7D

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 [illegible] ON 6-16-94 83-1343

G.I.R.-10

Individuals Considered as Informant Material

The New York Office reviewed the files of all persons who were elected originally to the present National Board, the National Committee, and the National Review Commission of the Communist Party, USA, from the New York area. The examination was conducted looking for weaknesses of these persons which could be exploited, disaffection, and proximity to national headquarters. Stress was placed on financial weakness and any violations of the Communist tenets unknown to the Party. In addition, the files of the members of the New York State Committee and persons employed at Party headquarters, 35 East 12th Street, New York City, were also reviewed even though they held no positions of prominence. As a result, [redacted] Bureau for consideration. [redacted] (U)

b7D

RECORDED - 109
INDEXED - 109

66-2542-3-419

In addition to the above, it was suggested that possibly [redacted], with whom the Bureau had considerable experience several years ago, might be in a position to act as a go-between or who might have access to a high Communist Party official. In view of the Bureau's experience with Tompkins, this suggestion was overruled by the Seat of Government. (U)

The names above listed were eliminated at the Seat of Government and the best possibilities such as [redacted] carefully reviewed and preliminary physical surveillances ordered to determine their daily habits for possible approach purposes. Several memoranda were prepared concerning [redacted] but the Director did not deem an approach to any of them propitious. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

59 AUG 2 1948

JDD:mn

Conf. Infts. in Genl. Intell. Work, Genl.

CONFIDENTIAL

Present Possibilities as Informants

At the present time [redacted], who has held a position of prominence in the Party and concerning whom a considerable review of the Bureau files was made about a year ago prior to the institution of this project, is in disfavor and all indications point to his being replaced as a leader in the Western Pennsylvania area. When the review of the references to [redacted] was made some time ago, it was believed at that time that he may have been an informant for some other interest but it was not deemed desirable, after our review was made, that he be approached by us. His present status in the Party may cause him to become dissatisfied with his lot and his situation is being carefully followed to determine whether he may not be approached by [redacted] in the near future. Of the other individuals on a high plane or close to the national headquarters [redacted], [redacted] the Party, appears to be the best possibility for an approach in the near future. It was not recommended in a memorandum of March 31, 1948, that he be approached at that time as he had just been transferred from Ohio to his present position in New York City and all indications pointed to his being wrapped up in his new job. It was also pointed out in that memorandum that [redacted] had been approached in 1943 by a subagent of [redacted] at which time [redacted] indicated unequivocally that he was a Communist and could not be bought. (U)

[redacted] of all the Party leaders does not appear to be the militant revolutionist type of Communist but is more concerned with the leisurely, calm exploitation of Communist doctrines. He does not have the Moscow training and some of the additional revolutionary attributes of the other high Party leaders. (U)

An approach to [redacted] carefully prepared to prevent any suspicion on his part that the individual is a provocateur may produce good results. A physical surveillance of [redacted] previously conducted did not reveal any avenue of approach and, therefore, the recommendation, as previously stated, was not made that [redacted] make any contact. [redacted] is still being kept in mind as a good possibility but no effort will be made at the present time to develop him due to the coming National Convention of the Party which will be held on August 3, 1948, and also the possible arrest of high Party leaders in the near future. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Future Possibilities

1. The special Federal Grand Jury at New York City is expected to return indictments shortly concerning the 12 members of the National Board of the Communist Party. Undoubtedly, none of these individuals will be approachable as informants or otherwise when that action is taken. Whether the arrest is made by Bureau Agents or United States Marshals, the members of the National Board will undoubtedly refuse to talk to anyone but their attorneys. Some confusion, however, will result within the Party as replacements will have to be made in certain positions in order that the Party can adequately function if the leaders are under indictment. Dissatisfaction may result in these appointments and by carefully watching the situation, an informant possibility may present itself. There will also be some reshuffling of Communists on lower levels which may give some of our present informants or informant possibilities promotions which will enable them to work for us on a much higher level within the Party. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

2. The National Convention of the Communist Party will be held in New York City August 2 to 5, 1948, and will probably result in the appointment of new members to the National Committee. When these appointments are made, the members of the new National Committee may be reviewed as was done by the New York Office last year to determine whether any of them are approachable as possible informants. (U)

Conclusion

No approach has been made by [redacted] to a high ranking Communist Party member or an individual working in Communist Party headquarters in New York City as a possible informant. Many individuals have been considered and the project has been brought to the attention of all In-Service classes as of paramount importance and has not at any time been allowed to cease. At the present time [redacted] is being carefully watched as a possibility and [redacted] has not been discarded completely even though he was not recommended on March 31, 1948. (U)

b7D

Two events about to transpire affect this project and after they have occurred, may be the means whereby added impetus should be given to the project to determine whether an informant may be obtained as a result. These events are the coming National Convention of the Communist Party and the possible arrest of the members of the National Board. Close attention will be given to the high ranking members of the Party and other individuals close to Party headquarters after these events transpire to ascertain whether, as a result thereof, an informant approach may be made. If a possibility presents itself, a separate memorandum will be prepared suggesting appropriate action. (U)

This project should of course be most carefully considered & developed.

H.

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 19, 1948

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR JUNE, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

The reports submitted by the field for June, 1948 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,591 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows:

Informants concerning German activities	29
Informants concerning Italian activities	9
Informants concerning Communist activities	1032
Informants concerning Japanese activities	40
Informants concerning other nationalities	198
Informants concerning general un-American activities	283
Total	*1,591

*Included in the total are 242 informants of the colored race.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(E) OF Class 10/20/81 DATE

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 bja/lis
ON 6-16-94
83-1343

Attachment.
ENCL

I assumed a very careful check is made as to productivity.

66-2542-3-419X
~~66-2542-4-128~~

F B I

31 JUL 27 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY SP4 MCJC

RECORDED - 61

INDEXED - 61

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SP7 MACJC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91

9-15-81

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential Informants in General intelligence work - General

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pmc

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
ALBANY	0	0	46 (3)	0	6	3 (1)	55 (4)
ANCHORAGE	0	0	5	0	9	0	14
ATLANTA	0	0	2 (1)	0	0	6 (1)	8 (2)
BALTIMORE	0	0	12 (3)	0	0	1 (1)	13 (4)
BIRMINGHAM	0	0	11 (2)	0	0	1	12 (2)
BOSTON	0	0	36 (1)	0	0	6 (5)	42 (6)
BUFFALO	0	0	32	0	3	0	35 (13)
BUTTE	0	0	28	6	3	10 (2)	50 (2)
CHARLOTTE	0	0	11	0	0	5	16 (4)
CHICAGO	2	0	91 (4)	5	1	24 (18)	123 (22)
CINCINNATI	11	2	19	1	5	7	45 (7)
CLEVELAND	1	0	31	1	1	4	38 (8)
DALLAS	0	0	2	0	0	0	
DENVER	2	0	1	4	0	0	
DETROIT	0	0	39	2	16	12	

* Includes Rumanian, Bulgarian, Jugoslavian, etc.

** Includes Ku Klux Klan, People's Institute of Applied Religion, American Bureau of Biro Bidjan American Jewish Council to Aid Russian Rehabilitation, etc.

() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY [illegible] REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

COPIES DESTROYED R 682 JUL 25 1961

66-2542-3-4-1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
EL PASO	0	0	8	0	0	12	20
HONOLULU	0	0	6	6	3	0	15
HOUSTON	0	0	9	0	2	7	18 (6)
INDIANAPOLIS	0	0	12	0	0	6	18 (8)
KANSAS CITY	7	3	7	0	0	5	22 (3)
KNOXVILLE	0	0	2	0	1	24	27
LITTLE ROCK	0	0	2	0	0	8	10 (8)
LOS ANGELES	1	0	71	1	7	5	85 (4)
LOUISVILLE	0	0	3	0	0	0	3 (1)
MEMPHIS	0	0	12 (4)	0	0	7 (7)	19 (11
MIAMI	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
MILWAUKEE	1	2	16	2	6	0	27 (5)
MOBILE	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
NEWARK	0	0	22	0	0	5	27 (5)
NEWHAVEN	0	0	30	0	0	0	30 (3)
NEW ORLEANS	0	0	12 (7)	0	0	2	14 (7)
NEW YORK	0	0	41 (3)	1	56	3	101 (3)
NORFOLK	0	0	18	0	1	2	21 (7)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
OKLAHOMA CITY	0	0	15 (1)	0	0	0	15 (1
OMAHA	0	0	12 (4)	0	0	0	12(4)
PHILADELPHIA	2	0	66	1	5	2	76(7)
PHOENIX	0	0	10	0	0	0	10(3)
PITTSBURGH	0	0	24	0	3	12	39(6)
PORTLAND	0	0	20 (3)	0	0	0	20(3)
RICHMOND	0	0	11	0	0	6	17(7)
ST. LOUIS	1	1	39 (4)	1	1	0	43(4)
ST. PAUL	0	0	27	1	0	6 (6)	34(6)
SALT LAKE CITY	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
SAN ANTONIO	0	0	8 (2)	1	1	1 (1)	11 (3
SAN DIEGO	0	0	6	4	8	10 (2)	28(2)
SAN FRANCISCO	0	0	70	0	12	17	99(12
SAN JUAN	1	0	23 (6)	0	18 (1)	21 (1)	63(8)
SAVANNAH	0	0	1	0	1	17 (11)	19(11
SEATTLE	0	0	38	0	3	9	50(3)
SPRINGFIELD	0	0	11	0	1	0	12(2)
WASHINGTON	0	1	9 (2)	0	25	17	52(2)
TOTALS	29	9	1032	40	198	283	1591 (242)

NOV 1 1950
Eft

66-2542-3-420
CHANGED TO
100-373571-38

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pm DMC JC

C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-12-81 BY 2842 DMD
mc/JC

Dab

66-2542-3-421

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-3-665

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/24/48

FROM : SAC Boston

SUBJECT: CONTACTS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

Re SAC letter No. 77, Series 1948, dated 5/15/48, Item B.

Numerous requests have been submitted by this office, in accordance with instructions contained in the above SAC letter, relating to the obtaining of Bureau authority prior to making any contact or interview at any school or university, pertaining to an Internal Security investigation.

In this connection the following observation is being called to the attention of the Bureau, in the belief that it would facilitate and expedite Security inquiries considerably, if blanket Bureau authority was obtained to examine the records maintained by the office of the Registrar of the various universities within this Field Division, and perhaps other Divisions, from which records pertinent background data is available for identification purposes in investigative reports, and for possible future investigative leads.

It appears that no serious consequence should arise from such blanket authority inasmuch as Agents of this office are constantly interviewing college Registrars and examining college records, for example, at Harvard University, Boston University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and other schools and colleges within this Field Division, in connection with various applicant investigations. In addition, inquiries are generally made of various alumni offices maintained by the colleges, in connection with these same inquiries, in order to obtain residence addresses and forwarding addresses for investigative purposes.

Accordingly I desire to recommend that the Bureau consider the granting of blanket authority to examine the records of the Registrar's office at schools or colleges in connection with Internal Security inquiries, in the same manner that such records are presently being examined in connection with the volume of Applicant inquiries being conducted in various Field Divisions or the Bureau. The Registrar's office of Harvard University is being contacted daily by Agents of this office in connection with such inquiries and it would appear that no embarrassment could come to the Bureau by extension of such authority in connection with Internal Security matters, and would preclude the necessity of correspondence with the Bureau in each instance, under the present Bureau regulations. In addition, in many instances the inquiry at the Registrar's office will be the only inquiry necessary.

66-2542-3-422

In the event any additional contact is desired of college officials, teachers or employees, specific authority could be requested in accordance with Bureau instructions.

TFMcL LHM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842 PMC/JMC/JC

Confidential notice of memo to Director, letter all 9-28-48 SAC's JEM

RECORDED - 2

INDEXED - 2

F B I

11 AUG 27 1948

61 OCT 11 1948

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: September 28, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATIONS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
SECURITY MATTER - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-12-81 BY 2842 PMC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

You will recall that by SAC Letter No. 77, Series 1948, dated May 15, 1948 (B), the Field was advised that hereafter they should conduct no investigations of individuals connected in any way with a campus, with certain exceptions, without prior Bureau authority. In addition, they were advised they were not to contact any individual connected with a campus in any capacity in connection with any security type investigation, with certain exceptions, without first securing Bureau authority.

The Boston Office has addressed a letter to the Bureau under date of August 24, 1948, wherein it is pointed out that it would facilitate and expedite such investigations considerably if blanket Bureau authority was issued to examine the records maintained by the Office of the Registrar of the various universities within that Division, from which records pertinent background data could be obtained for identification purposes in investigative reports and for possible future investigative leads.

The Boston Office pointed out that in their opinion no serious consequence should arise from such blanket authority inasmuch as Agents of that Office are constantly interviewing college Registrars and examining college records, for example, at Harvard University, Boston University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and other schools and colleges within that Field Division in connection with various applicant investigations. In addition, inquiries are generally made of various alumni offices maintained by the colleges in connection with these same inquiries in order to obtain residence addresses and forwarding addresses for investigative purposes.

The Boston Office recommended that the Bureau consider the advisability of granting blanket authority to examine the records of the Registrar's office at schools or colleges in connection with security type inquiries in the same manner that such records are presently being examined in connection with the volume of applicant inquiries being conducted throughout the Field. The Boston Office pointed out that it was not believed that any embarrassment would arise in connection with this matter and at the same time the extension of such authority would preclude the necessity of correspondence with the Bureau in each instance, under the present Bureau regulations.

I am inclined to agree with the recommendation of the Boston Office since I believe that no embarrassment will arise, particularly if the Field is cautioned in advance that their contacts must be reliable and that the SAC will be held personally responsible for any derelictions. I think that by

JEM:esb

OCT 15 1948

COPIES DESTROYED

R 588

RECORDED - 138
INDEXED - 138

166-2542-3-4-2-3

F B I

34 OCT 8 1948

Scope directive & Information to be served in Bureau files

authorizing the Division Offices to contact the Registrar's office of the various colleges in connection with security type investigations, a great deal of work will be saved in the Division Offices and here at the Bureau as well.

In the event you approve, there is attached hereto a letter to all SAC's authorizing them to contact the Registrars at colleges and other institutions of public learning in connection with security type cases.

Attachment

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 128
Series 1948

October 5, 1948

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
CONNELLEY
GLAVIN
HARBO
LADD
NICHOLS
ROSEN
TRACY
BAUMGARDNER
BAUGHMAN
CALLAHAN
CALLAN
CARLSON
CARTWRIGHT
CONRAD
DOWNING
EDWARDS, H. L.
EGAN
FEENEY
FLETCHER, H. B.
GURNEA
HARGETT
HINCE
JONES, M. A.
KEAY
LAUGHLIN
LEONARD
LONG
McCABE, E. J.
McCABE, N. H.
McGUIRE
McINTIRE
MOBLEY
MOHR
NANNA
NAUGHTEN
NEASE
PARSONS
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROGERS
SIZOO
TAMM, Q.
WAIKART
WALL
WHITSON
AND SUPERVISORS

RE: INVESTIGATIONS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES - SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 77, Series 1948, dated May 15, 1948, (B).

Hereafter it will be unnecessary to address a communication to the Bureau for the purpose of obtaining authority to contact the Registrars of any school, college or other institution of public learning in your Division for the purpose of obtaining from the school records pertinent background data and information useful for identification purposes or for the proper development of other investigative leads in security type investigations. Of course, you must be assured that the Registrar is reliable and can be depended upon not to divulge the Bureau's interest in any inquiry. The Bureau will hold you personally responsible to see that no embarrassing situations arise from the exercise of this authority.

In any case that there is a question as to whether a Registrar should be contacted, you, of course, should address a communication to the Bureau outlining the particular problem.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842 pm D/mc/JC

DUPLICATE YELLOW
66-2542-3-V
NOT RECORDED
10-8-48

53 OCT 13 1948

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-04-826

Confidential National Defense Informants Ken

SAC, Cincinnati

October 29, 1948

Director, FBI

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF STUDENTS, FACULTY MEMBERS AND ORGANIZATIONS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, SAC LETTER 77
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

It is noted that in the recent past numerous requests have been received from your Office relative to conducting investigations at colleges and universities or of students and faculty members.

Your request has been predicated on SAC Letter No. 152, Series 1947, and SAC Letter No. 32, Series 1948. While it is appreciated these two SAC letters are indirectly involved, the actual need of Bureau authority to conduct the above type investigations is set forth in SAC Letter No. 77, Series 1948, and as amended by SAC Letter No. 128, Series 1948. It is suggested that these two latter SAC letters be borne in mind when requesting the Bureau's authority to conduct the above type of investigation.

HT:jb;ed

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pm
mc/JC

INDEXED

Tolson
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Mohr
Pennington
Quinn Tamm
Room
Nease
Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 14
OCT 29 1948 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

424

F B I
45 NOV 2 1948

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. CLEGG ATTENTION: MR. McCABE DATE: September 8, 1948

FROM : ORVILLE R. TALBURTT

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED CHANGE IN SECTION 9A, SUB-SECTION (3), PARAGRAPH "c," MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS. (CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

It was suggested by Special Agent Joseph J. Palguta, New Agents' Class No. 10, that Paragraph "c" of Sub-Section (3) of Section 9A in the Manual of Rules and Regulations pertaining to "Confidential Informants" might be amended to include additional information furnished as "complete physical description and photograph where possible," so that the informant could be more easily identified.

Paragraph "c" of Sub-Section (3) as set forth in the Manual at the present time reads as follows: "Information should be obtained concerning his personal history including his first name, middle name and surname; date and place of birth; past and present business connections; trustworthiness and loyalty; credit and identification record."

It was suggested that this paragraph be changed to read as follows: "Information should be obtained concerning his personal history including his first name, middle name and surname; date and place of birth; past and present business connections; trustworthiness and loyalty; credit and identification record; complete physical description and photograph were possible."

It is felt that this change would be particularly helpful to the supervisors at the Bureau who handle National Defense Communist Informants in the event the following situation arises: A Communist Informant for one office could turn "sour" and be discharged. He could later go to another office and make efforts to sell his services to the Bureau.

Paragraph "d" of Sub-Section (3) of Section 9A states that no contact should be made with a prospective confidential informant concerning the investigation of Communist matters without prior approval of the Bureau and that this approval should be requested in a letter furnishing the background data which is required by Paragraph "c" of Sub-Section (3) of Section 9A.

In the event the above mentioned situation did exist, the supervisors in Washington Could more easily detect if a "sour" informant, who would undoubtedly change his name and date of birth and give fictitious places of residence and employment, was trying to dupe the Bureau.

It is also felt that a detailed physical description and photograph file of Confidential National Defense Communist Informants should be maintained at the Seat of Government.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the above mentioned manual change be made.

ORT:dcs

EX-16
RECORDED - 118
INDEXED - 118

66-3-425
F B I
5 NOV 23 1948

Jt. Comm. Memo
53 DEC 14 1948 HHC:dgh

[illegible]tates Department of Jus[illegible]
[illegible]l Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

[illegible]NAL ATTENTION

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

SAC LETTER NO. 144
Series 1948

November 16, 1948

SAC

ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D.
DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE [redacted] BY 58 [illegible] 3/18/83

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-851

(A) COMMUNIST CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS -- In connection with the trial of the members of the National Board of the Communist Party, it will be necessary to disclose many of our past Communist informants. The Party, to a great extent, will undoubtedly cover its activities and go deeper underground in certain localities. A great effort is now being made in many communities to ascertain our informants and, no doubt, a greater effort will be expended as soon as the trial begins.

All present informants who will not be disclosed during the trial should have their activities carefully supervised in order to prevent, if possible, any loss to our coverage which can be prevented.

A special effort should be made to obtain more informants to compensate for the loss to which we must become reconciled. Not only must considerable stress be placed on the obtaining of new informants to replace those which will be lost to us but a careful analysis should be made of all local officials, functionaries, organizers, et cetera, for any signs of disaffection or dissatisfaction which could be used to turn the individual into an informant. The object, of course, is to obtain an informant on as high a level as possible.

I again wish to emphasize the necessity of compensating for the loss of informants due to the trial of the Party leaders in order that we may discharge our duties with reference to the investigation of subversive activities generally and in particular Communism.

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-17-86 BY 2842 [illegible]~~

66-2542-3

NOT RECORDED
43 NOV 22 1948

58 DEC 1 1948

mc/jc

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 Rev. mc SC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM II
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91 7-17-81

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: November 3, 1948

FROM : H. B. Fletcher

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY FIGURES AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Kendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Intelligence work

Reference is made to my memorandum of July 16, 1948, concerning the status of this project in which it was pointed out that of the various possibilities suggested as informants on a high level, none had, as yet, been approached.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

In referenced memorandum, it was pointed out that the Federal Grand Jury was expected to return indictments against the twelve members of the National Board of the Communist Party and after this action had been taken, some possibilities may present themselves as informants. The position of the Communist Party as a whole was also to be carefully watched to ascertain whether any other prominent characters in the Communist movement would lend themselves as informant material. Another point which was mentioned was the national convention of the Communist Party which results, from time to time, in changes being made on the National Committee and the informant possibilities in regard to these changes was to be kept in mind. The Communist Party leaders have been indicted and their trial is scheduled for November 15, 1948.

The Supervisors on the Communist Party organization and individual desks have been watching for any informant possibilities since the indictment of the leaders and up to this time, no good prospects have presented themselves. The indictment and resulting publicity has not caused any leader to "see the light" and if this trial does not scare any of the leading functionaries, nothing probably will. Our chances of getting an informant on a high level as a result of this trial appear nil. Signs of disaffection or dissatisfaction or just plain shakiness have not been observed on other leaders throughout the movement, but all Supervisors are on the alert for any such signs which could be used to advantage to turn anyone into an informant.

Each In Service lecture on confidential informants stresses the necessity to watch the daily flow of information on the Communist Party and its members to spot any indications that a leader is weakening and may be approached as an informant.

At the present time, an approach is pending to an Organizer in New York State, namely, Robert Clark Johnston, and if this is successful, we may have an informant in a good position to get on the National Committee. Considerable time and effort have been expended in trying to find a high level Communist as a possible informant and it is believed that our efforts should not be diminished but rather channelel in another direction. The leaders and highest functionaries are died-in-the-wool Communists and as

DECLASSIFIED BY ... ON 6-16-91 ... 53-1343

JDD:mapa

RECORDED - 55
INDEXED - 55
EX-117

66-2542-3
F B I
12 NOV 24 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

shown by this project, are so imbued with the Communist philosophy that an approach to them as informants would have doubtful productivity. The solution seems to be to work our present informants or obtain new informants on a slightly lower level, watching for the opportunity for them to push themselves onto the National Committee or into headquarters in New York City. This may be possible if an approach to the organizer in New York State is successful. (U)

CONCLUSION:

It is suggested that no great concentration as a project be made to obtain an informant on the highest level in the Communist Party but that our efforts be directed toward the Organizers and local functionaries who are promoted many times to a position high in the Party and could be used to our advantage if so promoted. Of course, Supervisors and Field Agents will still be advised to remain alert at all times for signs of weakness or dissatisfaction on the part of many Communist Party officials or members, high or low, which could be used to make an approach. Our greatest effort should, however, be spent on present informants and new informants who can work themselves into a position of trust and eventually a high level in the Party. This will be impressed upon each In Service class and the Supervisors at the Seat of Government will remain watchful for any possible informant. (U)

It is also believed desirable that some notice be given to the Field of the Bureau's extreme interest in Communist informants and for approval, there is attached a proposed SAC Letter. (U)

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 pmd mc/4 JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91
7-17-81

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 7, 1948

FROM : THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

At the Executive Conference on December 3, 1948, attended by Messrs. Ladd, Carlson, Rosen, Harbo, Tracy, Mohr, McGuire, McCabe and Fletcher, the members of the Conference were informed that [redacted] former active Bureau informant who has testified during the past year on several Immigration deportation cases involving Communists and who in April, 1948, testified before the Washington State Un-American Activities Committee, has confidentially advised that [redacted] are two individuals whom he recruited into the Communist Party. He describes them as good friends. [redacted] resided at Buffalo and [redacted] had heard that they were close to disaffection with the Communist Party. (U)

b7D

[redacted] describes [redacted] as a very able Negro, highly regarded by leaders of the Communist Party, and he believes he can convert [redacted] into working as a Bureau informant. (U)

[redacted] desired to be paid at the rate of [redacted] a day plus his expenses to go to Buffalo. He indicated he planned to reside with the [redacted] while at that point. (U)

This matter has been held in abeyance since April, 1948, because [redacted] was required to go to San Francisco and [redacted] went to Florida about that time. The Buffalo Office now advises that [redacted] has not returned and apparently is separated from [redacted] The Buffalo Office further advises that [redacted] is considered to be one of the leading Communist Party members of the Buffalo area and he would make a valuable informant. It was proposed that an effort be made to turn [redacted] through [redacted] and that [redacted] be paid [redacted] a day plus expenses, estimated total cost [redacted] It was believed the expense involved was small considering the possible favorable results. (U)

b7D

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that [redacted] should be paid at the rate of [redacted] a day plus his expenses, having in mind an estimated total cost of [redacted] and that [redacted] be instructed to attempt the development of [redacted] in behalf of the Bureau as an informant. (U)

For your approval, there is attached an appropriate letter addressed to the New York and Buffalo Offices in accord with the opinion of the Conference.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

RECORDED - 119
INDEXED - 119

Clyde Tolson

166-2542-3-427
F B I
DEC 22 1948

50 DEC 31 1948

cc - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

HBF:cmw

EX-69

CONFIDENTIAL

STAND... NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 14, 1948

FROM : JOINT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 89
EMPLOYEE: INSPECTOR T. E. NAUGHTEN

SAVINGS: NONE
AWARD: NONE

MEMBERS PRESENT: H. H. Clegg
R. T. Harbo
S. K. McKee
M. W. McFarlin

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

dgh

SUGGESTION: The existing Bureau instructions require that Bureau approval be made prior to contacting colleges or university officials in connection with security investigation inquiries.

It is suggested that this rule be changed to authorize the Special Agent in Charge of each office to give such clearance to agents assigned to their offices, with the SAC's to be held strictly accountable and that the contacts should be made only by experienced Special Agents.

It is noted that the restriction presently imposed upon the Field does not apply to Loyalty cases, Atomic Energy cases or other applicant-type investigations. Inquiries of the registrars at the schools concerning records can, of course, be made without Bureau authorization.

The recent Inspectors' Conference was not in favor of the recommendation.

JOINT COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION:

The Joint Committee was unanimously unfavorable on the ground that prior experience has indicated the desirability of maintaining a close check over the types of contacts in question. It is felt that the SAC will carefully consider all phases of each individual case before he recommends to the Bureau that approval be given for the contact.

ENCL. 59

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

Unanimously unfavorable, 12/20/48, by Messrs. Ladd, Tracy, N.H.McCabe, Rosen, Mohr, Carlson, Fletcher, Glavin, Nease, Harbo.

Respectfully,
For the Conference
Clyde Tolson.

RECORDED - 59
INDEXED - 59

66-2542-3-428

12 DEC 24 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/3/91 2-12-81 BY SP5 cl dcg

#323013

cc: Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

28422

RTH:dgh

63 JAN 31 1949

205

Confidential Informants in General Intelligence Work - Gen'l

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2554-7059

THIS PERS. FILES

PX(D) #89

Sugg

CONTACTS WITH COLLEGE OFFICIALS

Present Bureau Rule:

The present rule is that when a contact is to be made with a college president or professor or similar college official, the Bureau must approve the particular contact. I feel this is too restrictive and that the responsibility can actually more logically be placed in the SAC.

Suggestion:

It is suggested that the Agents of the field obtain clearance from their SAC's prior to contacts of any college officials, including presidents, professors, or the like, the SAC to be personally responsible for the exercise of good judgment. I specifically include in this suggestion that the contacts themselves be made only by experienced Special Agents, the SAC's to be held strictly accountable for this.

T. E. NAUGHTEN

TEN:EOD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pm JMC JC

not loyalty - DEA
only Sec - non applicable

Jt. Comm. Memo
12/14/48 RH:dgh
Exp Comp.
12/20/48 RH

ENCLOSURE
66-2542-3-428

General Bureau of Investigati

United States Department of Justice

Post Office Box 812
Chicago 90, Illinois

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~AIRMAIL~~

December 10, 1948

Director, FBI

6

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Declassification
DATE 9/20/79 GAJ/RLS

Re: [redacted]
CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANT [redacted]
(Bureau File 66-2542)

b7D

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Chicago letter dated June 8, 1948, requesting authorization to pay the above informant at the rate of [redacted] per week, and Bureau letter dated June 17, 1948, granting such authority for a period of six months effective June 23, 1948. The informant has been paid at the above requested amount and continues to be of value to the Chicago Office.

This informant furnished a report of a special meeting of Communist leaders which was held July 2, 1948, at the Ashland Auditorium in Chicago. He furnished the names of the Party leaders who were in attendance. [redacted] District [redacted] gave the principal talk during which he stated that the Party was again facing a crisis as it did in 1920 and 1933. [redacted], during his talk, was also very critical of the current Yugoslav Government; he accused [redacted] of putting himself above the Party. He stated that [redacted] should either be placed back in line or "liquidated". b7D

This informant furnished a report of a special UAW section meeting of the Communist Party which was held at the Du Sable Center on July 27, 1948. [redacted] section organizer, gave the principal report which consisted of a report on the state convention which had been held previously during the month of July. [redacted] spoke concerning the indictment of the twelve Communist leaders and stated that labor leaders and leaders of the Communist Party are being terrorized by the constant threat of frame-ups and arrests. He urged that protests be made in the form of telegrams to President TRUMAN and Congress.

RECORDED - 39
INDEXED - 39

On October 17, 1948, the informant reported a meeting of the Auto Section of the Communist Party which was held at the Du Sable Center in Chicago. [redacted] functionary of the Party in Chicago, gave a talk concerning the Berlin situation. According to the informant [redacted] stated that there is no blockade of Berlin since the western powers are still able b7D

61 JAN 6 1948

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-1 GSK
ON 6/21/79

Director, FBI, 12/.0/48 Re: [redacted] b7D
CNDI [redacted]

to make contact by means of air. He stated that the Soviet Union does not permit the western powers to go through the Soviet zone to get to Berlin for the reason that they would not observe the traffic regulations of the zone.

Informant furnished a report of the Executive Board meeting of the Auto #1 Club of the Auto Section of the Communist Party which was held on August 22 at 4400 Lawndale Avenue in Chicago. [redacted] was the principal speaker and stated that the State Committee of the Communist Party had decided to concentrate in key industries. He stated that the Electromotive Division of General Motors located in La Grange, Illinois, had been decided as a key point for concentration.

Informant attended a meeting of the Southwest Section of the Communist Party which was held at [redacted], the home of [redacted] a district functionary of the Communist Party in Chicago, on August 18, 1948. This meeting was concerned with the organizing of concentration points in basic industries. It was announced that the Southwest Section was to concentrate on the following divisions: (1) Crane Company, (2) Steel, (3) Continental Can Company, (4) American Can Company, (5) Campbell Soup Company and (6) Corn Products Refining Company. b7D

The Auto Section of the Communist Party held a meeting at the Du Sable Center in Chicago on September 8, 1948. The informant reported that [redacted] a Communist leader in UAW-CIO, was the principal speaker. His talk was concerned principally with the Progressive Party campaign.

The informant furnished a report of a mass meeting of the Communist Party which was held at the Ashland Auditorium on October 10, 1948. Informant reported that there were several national leaders and most of the district leaders of the Communist Party present at this meeting. The national leaders known to the informant were ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN and BENJAMIN DAVIS, JR. There were approximately 2500 persons in attendance at the meeting. ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN gave a talk entitled "The Twelve And You". GIL GREEN also spoke as one of the twelve referred to by FLYNN in her talk. A collection of $4500 was taken up at the meeting.

Informant furnished a report on a meeting of the Auto Section of the Communist Party held at the Du Sable Center on November 10, 1948. This meeting was concerned with a discussion of the outcome of the presidential election. [redacted] section organizer, explained that [redacted] did not receive more votes because of the terroristic practices against voters and polling place watchers in the campaign for [redacted] stated that the Communist Party must now do everything possible to force President TRUMAN to fulfil all campaign promises. [redacted] also spoke at this meeting and stated that the State Committee has set a quota of 5,000 new members in the current recruiting drive. b7D

Director, FBI, 12/10/48 Re: [redacted] b7D
CNDI [redacted]

The above are merely examples of the type of reports on meetings submitted by the above informant who continues to furnish valuable information to the Chicago Office. It is also pointed out that this informant was recently interviewed by an Assistant to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining whether or not he would be used as a witness in the case of the twelve members of the National Board of the Communist Party. The reports of the informant are being furnished to the New York Office for study by the Assistant to the Attorney General. As of this time it has not been definitely determined whether or not the informant will be used in this coming trial.

In view of the above, authority is requested to pay the informant at the rate of [redacted] per week for a period of six months commencing December 23, 1948. b7D

Very truly yours,

G. R. Mc Swain
Special Agent in Charge

HCP:MD
66-2185

COPY:RMB

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: January 12, 1949

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - BRIEF
INTERNAL SECURITY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 DMD MC/JC

The following observations are being made as a result of the recent experiences encountered during the interviews of informants by the United States Attorney to determine whether they would make effective witnesses in this trial. It is felt that the field should be generally advised of what occurred and that specific steps be taken to eliminate, or at least reduce, future occurrences of this character in view of their obvious embarrassment to the Bureau.

You will recall that three informants who had submitted written reports dealing with the revolutionary aspects of the Communist Party, USA, having actually reported statements of a revolutionary character allegedly made at Communist Party meetings, upon interview by the United States Attorney stated that in their opinion the Communist Party intended to bring about socialism by peaceful means or by the ballot. They could not satisfactorily explain the descrepancies between their previous reports and their present views, and were very hazy about the facts as set forth in their notes. In one of these instances, the United States Attorney stated that the informant was either stupid or was lying.

In another case, an informant who had reported what appeared to be extremely significant material demonstrating the revolutionary and conspiratorial characteristics of the Party, admitted on interview that he had lied and that he had reported this type of information because he had a personal grievance against the local Communist Party Chairman. Several other informants were unable to substantiate the data set out in their reports, and were very vague about the aims and objectives of the Party, in addition to being totally unfamiliar with basic Communist Party Literature, in spite of the fact that their reports would indicate to the contrary.

While it is probably true that there is no such animal as a "High caliber informant" and while their very occupation speels duplicity, it is felt that careful and methodical interviews with informants who have reported significant material will at least serve two obvious purposes and will minimize the possibilities of future occurrences such as indicated hereinbefore. It will not only crystallize the information in the informant's mind, but will also enable the field in some instances to determine whether the informant is telling the truth and establish a basis for checking out inconsistencies in the informant's report. In this connection, it is also suggested that every effort be made by the field to corroborate pertinent data which has been reported by informants, thereby affirmatively determining the integrity of the information being obtained. While it may be true that these practices are already used in many of our field offices, it seems that reiteration at this time in the form of an SAC letter would have a salutary effect in light of

RECORDED - 10 64-3545 431

186

63 FEB 4

...NAL COPY FILED IN

our recent experiences. The Bureau's work in the intelligence field is receiving continually closer scrutiny and the ability of our informants to substantiate and confirm pertinent material reported by them is looked upon as being within the Bureau's responsibilities.

It is to be observed that the foregoing comments apply principally to evidentiary data submitted by informants, i.e., data relating to the basic doctrines of the Communist Party, USA, as described in the Brief and intended for use at judicial proceedings. However, they also apply to relevant intelligence information being received.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that an SAC Letter directed to the field setting forth the aforementioned observations be prepared. An SAC Letter in this regard is attached hereto for your approval.

Attachment.

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No.

SAC LETTER NO. 2
Series 1949

January 5, 1949

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
CONNELLEY
GLAVIN
HARBO
LADD
NICHOLS
ROSEN
TRACY
BAUMGARDNER
BAUGHMAN
CALLAHAN
CALLAN
CARLSON
CARTWRIGHT
CONRAD
DOWNING
EDWARDS, H. L.
EGAN
FEENEY
FLETCHER, H. B.
GURNEA
HARGETT
HINCE
JONES, M. A.
KEAY
LAUGHLIN
LEONARD
LONG
McCABE, E. J.
McCABE, N. H.
McGUIRE
McINTIRE
MOBLEY
MOHR
NANNA
NAUGHTEN
NEASE
PARSONS
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROGERS
SIZOO
TAMM, Q.
WAIKART
WALL
WHITSON
AND SUPERVISORS

(A) INTERVIEWS WITH INFORMANTS - COMMUNIST MATTERS -- Recently several instances have arisen wherein informants who have been repeatedly interviewed by Bureau Agents have furnished to other Government Agencies and Committees information which they have never furnished to the FBI. From these instances, it is apparent that all of the available information is not being obtained from our informants and this situation must be immediately remedied.

Hereafter, wherever Agents conduct an interview with any informant concerning Communist matters, the interview must be most thorough and searching. All of the informant's past Communist activities should be carefully gone into and the interview should be such that the informant will be taxed to recall the various past events which he may have temporarily forgotten. It is realized that in some instances where the informant has been particularly active in the Communist movement that all of the information he possesses cannot be obtained during the initial interview and in such instances arrangements should be made for a subsequent interview in the immediate future before the first interview is concluded.

While I desire to place particular emphasis on the interviewing of informants in connection with Communist matters, it is elementary that whenever we interview any individual in connection with an investigation that we should obtain all of the pertinent information concerning the investigation that the informant possesses.

I desire that each official of the Bureau to whom this memorandum is directed discuss the contents with his investigative and supervisory personnel so that in the future our interviews will be conducted in a proper, vigorous, and searching manner.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pmd
mc/jc

166-2542
NOT RECORDED
87 JAN 12 1949

5 JAN 12 1949

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-04-867

U.S. GOVERNMENT FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: January 25, 1949

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR DECEMBER, 1948

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Beaningham
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

The reports submitted by the field for December, 1948 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,615 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows: b(1)

Informants concerning German activities	26
Informants concerning Italian activities	9
Informants concerning Communist activities	1062
Informants concerning Japanese activities	40
Informants concerning other nationalities	203
Informants concerning general un-American activities	275
Total	1615*

*Included in the total are 212 informants of the colored race. b(1)

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

Attachment.

2 ENCL

Confidential Informants in Espionage, Subversive Activities, Propaganda, Work - Espionage

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-12-81 BY 2842 PWD mcl J C

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp6/ga/lp ON 6-16-94 83-1543

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 004 MAC J C
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81 9-15-81

66-2542-3-432X

RECORDED 42 66-2542-4-136

EX-76

F B I

3 JAN 31 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES

DATE 10/20/81 class

FILE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 20 1961

58 FEB 9 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED ... HEREIN
SLIP ...
DATE 18/02/01

DECLASSIFIED BY ... ON 6-16-94

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
ALBANY	0	0	29	0	0	0	29 (2)
ANCHORAGE	0	0	5	0	8	0	13
ATLANTA	0	0	3 (2)	0	0	6 (1)	9 (3)
BALTIMORE	0	0	12 (3)	0	0	1 (1)	13 (4)
BIRMINGHAM	0	0	11 (1)	0	0	1	12 (1)
BOSTON	0	0	32 (1)	0	0	2 (1)	34 (2)
BUFFALO	0	0	36 (6)	0	3	0	39 (6)
BUTTE	0	0	31	11	1	5 (2)	48 (2)
CHARLOTTE	0	0	14	0	0	7	21 (4)
CHICAGO	2	0	86	4	0	25 (18)	117 (21)
CINCINNATI	12	2	21	0	12	8 (8)	55 (8)
CLEVELAND	0	0	31	1	2	3	37 (7)
DALLAS	0	0	3 (2)	0	0	0	3 (2)
DENVER	2	0	4	4	0	0	10 (1)
DETROIT	0	0	47	2	16	11	76 (6)

* Includes Rumanian, Bulgarian, Jugoslavian, etc.
** Includes Ku Klux Klan, People's Institute of Applied Religion, American Bureau of Biro Bidjan, Atomic Energy Matters, etc.
() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE
66-2542-4-136

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY ... REASON FOR ... FCIM, II, 1-... DATE OF ... DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 20 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
EL PASO	0	0	10 (1)	0	0	40	50 (1)
HONOLULU	0	0	20	6	3	0	29
HOUSTON	0	0	10	0	2	8	20 (6)
INDIANAPOLIS	0	0	13	0	0	6	19 (8)
KANSAS CITY	4	3	12	0	0	8	27 (3)
KNOXVILLE	0	0	2	0	0	25	27
LITTLE ROCK	0	0	2	0	0	8	10 (8)
LOS ANGELES	1	0	76 (4)	1	8	7	93 (4)
LOUISVILLE	0	0	3	0	0	0	3 (1)
MEMPHIS	0	0	15 (3)	0	0	8 (8)	23 (11)
MIAMI	0	0	2 (2)	0	0	0	2 (2)
MILWAUKEE	1	2	16	2	16	0	37 (6)
MOBILE	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
NEWARK	0	0	19	0	0	5	24 (5)
NEW HAVEN	0	0	37	0	0	0	37 (3)
NEW ORLEANS	0	0	15	0	0	4	19
NEW YORK	0	0	41 (4)	1	55	3	100 (4)
NORFOLK	0	0	17	0	0	1	18 (7)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3)

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
OKLAHOMA CITY	0	0	15 (1)	0	0	1	16 (1)
OMAHA	0	0	9 (2)	0	0	0	9 (2)
PHILADELPHIA	2	0	72	1	5	1	81 (7)
PHOENIX	0	0	9	0	0	0	9 (3)
PITTSBURGH	0	0	27	0	0	7	34 (3)
PORTLAND	0	0	16 (2)	0	0	0	16 (2)
RICHMOND	0	0	11	0	0	6	17 (7)
ST. LOUIS	1	1	38	1	1	0	42 (5)
ST. PAUL	0	0	20 (6)	2	0	0	22 (6)
SALT LAKE CITY	0	0	6	0	0	0	6
SAN ANTONIO	0	0	9 (2)	0	1	1 (1)	11 (3)
SAN DIEGO	0	0	7	4	8	10 (2)	29 (2)
SAN FRANCISCO	0	0	74	0	14	8	96 (8)
SAN JUAN	1	0	23 (6)	0	16 (1)	17 (1)	57 (8)
SAVANNAH	0	0	1	0	1	17 (11)	19 (11)
SEATTLE	0	0	31 (2)	0	1	3	35 (2)
SPRINGFIELD	0	0	10	0	1	0	11 (2)
WASHINGTON	0	1	7 (2)	0	29	12	49 (2)
TOTALS	26	9	1062	40	203	275	1615 (212)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Room 5744 1-25 1949

TO:
- ✓ Director
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Fletcher
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Carlson
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy
- Personnel Files Section
- Records Section
- Mrs. Skillman

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

See Me For Appropriate Action

Send File Note and Return

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842 PMD
mc/JC

Clyde Tolson

FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: November 26, 1948

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

The Executives Conference of November 23, 1948, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Mohr, Carlson, Clegg, Fletcher, Rosen, Harbo, Q. Tamm, Nease and Glavin, considered the problem of handling confidential informants.

It was pointed out to the Conference that at the present time those informants who are hired on a continuous basis over a long period of time are listed in the Confidential Informants' index maintained in the Security Division and are included in the tabulation prepared monthly reflecting payments made to regular confidential informants each month. There are instances where informants are hired for one, two or three months and are not reflected on this list because they are not considered as continuing informants. There are also informants who are paid on a c.o.d. basis who are not included in the "Paid Confidential Informant List." This latter type of informant is one who is paid for a bit of spot information he may furnish us at any time and is not regularly considered as a continuing informant. For instance, a member of the underworld may furnish us information concerning the location of a wanted fugitive, is paid on a c.o.d. basis, and his services would not be utilized again until he could furnish further information which the Bureau is particularly desirous of securing.

The Conference, in considering who should and who should not be considered as a continuing confidential informant, unanimously recommends that in every instance where an informant is paid on a predetermined rate, whether it be weekly, semi-monthly or monthly, regardless of the length of time he is to be continued as an informant, that he be considered as a continuing informant; that all be included in our Confidential Informants' index; and that they also be included on the monthly report of payments made to confidential informants. The only individuals who will not be considered as continuing confidential informants are those who are paid on a c.o.d. basis for spot information of importance.

Should the Director agree, this policy will be followed.

Respectfully submitted,
FOR THE CONFERENCE

Clyde Tolson

CC - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

WRG:tgh

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2554-7143

RECORDED - 19
RECORDED - 19
INDEXED - 19
11 FEB 1949
EX-16
38
RECEIVED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-84 BY SP5 cildog 2842 pm mc/JC

31 FEB 18 1949

CONF. INFO. is in General Intelligence Work - General

COPY:AJH

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI DATE: February 8, 1949

FROM : SAC, Kansas City

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - BRIEF
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Comp Dept - in general [illegible]

Attention is invited to SAC Letter No. 11, Series 1949, dated January 28, 1949, as captioned herein.

The communication referred to requests that the Special Agents in Charge submit any observations believed calculated to eliminate or reduce the occurrences of the character outlined therein.

During several years of experience in the Bureau, I have found that in almost every type of case on occasions we will find unreliable, undependable, hostile, unwilling, and recalcitrant witnesses. There have been occasions, of which I am cognizant, when witnesses first were interviewed they appeared to be entirely cooperative and willing. As time for the use of these witnesses in court approached, they became hostile, uncooperative, and unwilling. There is no reason to believe that witnesses in Communist and related matters will be any different than those in other types of cases handled by the Bureau.

I am of the very strong opinion that many of our Special Agents, which would include many now in the service and those who have left the services, are not sufficiently "tough-minded" and realistic in their approaches to investigative matters. By this statement, I mean that the minds of many of our Special Agents, present and past, have not been appropriately conditioned for the handling of investigative matters, the gathering of information and evidence and appropriately evaluating it for the use to which it will eventually be put. I am somewhat inclined to the view that in the past some of our Communist investigations have been of a nature which would be calculated to get something into the record and into the files, an appropriate evaluation thereof having not been made or considered. Much of the information, I fear, which we have put into our files in the past in some of the Communist cases has not been substantiated and appropriately corroborated. The fact is that over a period of years very little, if any, of the information which we have gathered and collected in Communist cases has been used in a prosecutive manner.

DB:mjd

RECORDED - 72 66-2542-3.4 BB
F B I
14 MAR 17 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 [illegible]

In other words, the witnesses who furnish the information and the data furnished by the witnesses have never been put to the test in court. The test of our information and the data collected is whether it will stand up in a court of law. I am certain that had we over the years been utilizing in a prosecutive manner the information which we have collected in Communist cases that the occurrences outlined in the Bureau letter referred to would have been reduced measurably.

I believe that again it should be pointed out and re-emphasized to all of our Special Agents in Communist, as well as in all other types of cases, that they are engaged in serious business, that they are not on a college campus, that they are in a man's world and are engaged in a man's work. The mere fact that a Special Agent in Charge or someone designated by him mentions a matter of this kind to some Special Agents on one occasion will not appropriately condition the minds of young men for investigative work such as performed by the Bureau. It has been my experience that in order to appropriately condition the thinking of a Special Agent that instruction is a continuing thing.

I believe in the handling of Communist cases and in contacting the various informants in connection therewith who are potential and prospective witnesses, over a period of time, Special Agents of maturity, experience, and good judgment should be able to ascertain and determine in a large measure whether such informants would make satisfactory witnesses. I think that it would be appropriate for Special Agents tactfully and adroitly to ascertain in these contacts the mental attitude of a witness toward testifying and that inquiries of this nature, which would comprehend the willingness of such persons to become a witness, should not be limited to one occasion, but that the Special Agents should keep themselves continuously informed in such matters. A witness may be willing to testify in the early part of 1949, but by the latter part of the year or even after the lapse of a few months may have a change of mind and attitude. I believe that what a witness says to a Special Agent about willingness or unwillingness to testify should be furnished in its entirety by Special Agents to the United States Attorney or to the Special Assistant to the

Attorney General, if there be one, who is to handle the prosecutive features of a case. I have known of instances in which Special Agents of good judgement and patience and tolerance have in an entirely ethical manner, and in conformity in all respect to the preservation of civil rights and liberties of persons, influenced or convinced what were at one time apparently hostile persons to become willing and cooperative witnesses.

It is my observation that when we will have used more of the information gathered by us in a prosecutive manner in Communist cases and when Special Agents begin actually to see this occur, gaining by the experience, the quality of the material and information obtained in such cases will improve measurably.

The things mentioned herein are not new, but are procedures, techniques and principles which are immutable and, of course, unchanging. I trust that the Bureau will appreciate and understand the spirit in which I write these observations.

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 11
Series 1949

January 28, 1949

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
CONNELLEY
GLAVIN
HARBO
LADD
NICHOLS
ROSEN
TRACY
BAUMGARDNER
BOSWELL
CALLAHAN
CALLAN
CARLSON
CARTWRIGHT
CONRAD
DOWNING
EDWARDS, H. L.
EGAN
FEENEY
FLETCHER, H. B.
GURNEA
HINCE
JONES, M. A.
KEAY
LAUGHLIN
LEONARD
LONG
McCABE, E. J.
McCABE, N. H.
McGUIRE
McINTIRE
MOBLEY
MOHR
NANNA
NAUGHTEN
NEASE
PARSONS
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROGERS
SIZOO
TAMM, Q.
WAIKART
WALL
WHITSON
AND SUPERVISORS

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - BRIEF
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

In connection with the trial of the Communist Party leadership, approximately sixty informants, including current and former Bureau informants as well as former members of the Communist Party, were interviewed by the United States Attorney or his representatives to determine whether they would make effective witnesses in this case. It is estimated that thirty of the sixty informants interviewed will actually appear as witnesses in the trial. While this over-all percentage is satisfactory, the reaction of several informants upon interview left much to be desired, and it is in this connection that the following observations are being made in an effort to improve the value of the information being reported to the Bureau by its informants. While these observations are mainly concerned with evidentiary information reported by informants, i.e., information dealing with the basic doctrines of the Communist Party, USA, and intended for use in judicial proceedings, they are also applicable to a large portion of the intelligence data being reviewed.

As you know, the case against the Communist Party, USA, hinges largely on the integrity and the reliability of reports submitted by current Bureau informants who are at present members of the Party. In view of this, it is absolutely essential that the Bureau in the future be especially assiduous to make certain, if at all possible, that (1) the informant understands the meaning and significance of the information he has reported, and (2) that the information is accurately reported by him.

In connection with the aforementioned interviews, three informants who had submitted written reports dealing with the revolutionary aspects of the

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842 pm DMG

NOT RECORDED
6 1949

FEB 8 1949

Communist Party, USA, having actually reported statements of a revolutionary character allegedly made at Communist Party meetings, upon interview by the United States Attorney stated that in their opinion the Communist Party intended to bring about socialism by peaceful means or by the ballot. They could not satisfactorily explain the discrepancies between their previous reports and their present views, and were very hazy about the facts as set forth in their notes. In one of these instances, the United States Attorney stated that the informant was either stupid or was lying.

In another case, an informant who had reported what appeared to be extremely significant material demonstrating the revolutionary and conspiratorial characteristics of the Party, admitted on interview that he had lied and that he had reported this type of information because he had a personal grievance against the local Communist Party Chairman. Several other informants were unable to substantiate the data set out in their reports, and were very vague about the aims and objectives of the Party, in addition to being totally unfamiliar with basic Communist Party literature, in spite of the fact that their reports would indicate to the contrary.

While it may be true that some of these informants feigned a lack of knowledge to prevent their being called as witnesses, it is also true that future occurrences such as these can be minimized by careful and methodical interviews with these informants at the time significant material is reported by them. This will serve two obvious purposes. It will not only help to crystallize the information in the informant's mind, but it will also enable you in some instances to determine whether the informant is telling the truth, and will give you a basis for checking out inconsistencies in his report. In this connection, it is also desired that every effort be made to corroborate pertinent data reported by informants and thereby affirmatively determine the integrity of the information being obtained. In addition, informants should be encouraged to become familiar with Communist Party literature, and efforts should be made to observe the progress of particular informants in this regard. Informants must be required to place pertinent data into written form for possible future reference. Of course, the success of this latter observation depends largely on the capabilities of the informant and the degree of activity in Communist Party affairs.

The importance of this matter to the Bureau's investigation of Communist activities cannot be overestimated. Our work in the intelligence field is receiving continually closer scrutiny and now that our informants are being called upon to substantiate their reports, it is imperative that we make every effort to see that they can intelligently and clearly discuss what they have previously reported.

In the event you have any observations to make which will enable us to eliminate, or at least reduce, occurrences of the character outlined above, it is desired that you immediately submit them for consideration and review.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Los Angeles, California
May 3, 1949

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

Re: [redacted]

b7D

Dear Sir: Cont. Int.

The above confidential informant is being assigned Los Angeles [redacted]

This individual is a manufacturer of gambling supplies and equipment, including dice, roulette, crap, and poker tables. He also sells other gambling supplies and is in contact with gamblers of all types, including bookmakers, throughout the country.

[redacted] was formerly in business in Las Vegas, Nevada, assisting in the operation of one of the large hotels there. He presently resides at [redacted], Long Beach, telephone 82254. His business is located at [redacted] Long Beach, telephone 93935.

b7D

He has furnished valuable information to this office and he expressly requests that all contacts with him be entirely confidential. Therefore, he should be contacted only by Special Agents ALFRED G. GUNN and LESLIE R. HALL.

DECLASSIFIED BY 3842 PM DMC JC
ON 7-17-81

Very truly yours,

R. B. Hood

R. B. HOOD, SAC

AGG:KH
66-120B-3280

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED THROUGH ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Class
DATE 10/20/81 BMJ

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

RECORDED - 115

66-2042-3-434
F B I
23 MAY 12 1949

INDEXED - 115

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

56 MAY 16 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 DMD MCJC

See Letter #50 April 26, 1949

(K) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS - HANDLING OF -- Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 11, Series 1949, dated January 28, 1949, entitled "Communist Party, USA - Brief - Internal Security - C," which summarized the results of the interviews with Bureau informants who were being considered as witnesses in the trial of that case in New York.

This communication pointed out the necessity of careful and methodical interviews with informants relative to information reported by them as well as the need for corroboration of significant data reported.

The Bureau desires to call to your attention the following additional observations which were brought to the attention of the Bureau by a Special Agent in Charge.

The problems of handling Communist informants who are potential witnesses are similar to those encountered by the Bureau in every type of case over many years. There have been witnesses who appeared to be entirely willing to testify, but as the time approached for use of these witnesses in court, they became hostile and unwilling. While this problem is recognized, the instances when we are not aware of the possibility that the potential witness in a Communist or other type of case may become recalcitrant should be few providing the Agent regularly contacting the informant is alert and discerning.

Special Agents of maturity, experience and good judgment should be able to ascertain during regular contacts with informants whether such informants would make satisfactory witnesses. They should be able to tactfully and adroitly determine in these contacts the mental attitude of the informants toward testifying, and such efforts should not be limited to one case but the Special Agents should keep themselves continuously informed in such matters.

Many of the investigations regarding Communist matters show clearly that they have been conducted for the purpose of getting something into the files and records without an appropriate evaluation of the information being made. In some instances, no effort has been made to substantiate the information received through informants. Special Agents handling informants should be realistic in gathering and evaluating evidence received through such sources. The importance of corroboration of pertinent data reported by informants was set forth in SAC Letter No. 11, Series 1949, referenced above.

It has been suggested that when more of the information gathered in Communist cases has been used in prosecutions the quality of the material contained in such cases will improve through experience thus gained by Special Agents. While it is recognized that experience will improve the handling of any type of case, the Bureau feels that by drawing on the experiences of the past in other types of cases which have been prosecuted, a material improvement can be made over the conditions found to exist regarding the information and informants being utilized in the trial of the Communist Party leadership.

58 MAY 12 1949

To achieve such an improvement, it is necessary that it be pointed out and re-emphasized to Special Agents in Communist as well as other types of cases the importance of the Bureau's work and the necessity for thorough and intelligent handling of investigations.

The problems submitted here and instructions regarding the handling of these problems have been discussed thoroughly in training schools at the Seat of Government, but it is found that instruction in these matters is a continuing thing if the Agents are to be appropriately conditioned for investigative work such as that performed by the Bureau.

It is imperative that such training be continued in the field, particularly with respect to the personnel handling confidential informants of all types. Close supervision should be afforded the work of these Agents to insure that the maximum effectiveness of the informant is being realized and at the same time that the Agents handling informants are aware of the potential value of such informants as witnesses. This supervision should also comprehend a determination as to whether the Agents are adequately making every effort possible to corroborate information received through confidential informants.

In making assignments of Agents to handling live, active, valuable informants, whether with regard to Communist or other types of cases, each Special Agent in Charge should select for such handling Agents of maturity, experience and sound judgment. It should be borne in mind and the fact should frequently be brought to the attention of personnel handling Communist matters that many of the investigations relating to Communist matters may at a future date be used in prosecutions. It is, therefore, imperative in such investigations that Special Agents be mindful and alert to these possibilities.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 17, 1949

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

Confidential Infts. General Intelligence Work

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INDEX FILES

General

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

The Executives Conference on June 16, 1949, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Tracy, Glavin, Harbo, Carlson, Ladd, Fletcher, Nichols, Rosen and Clegg, considered the maintenance of Confidential Informant Index Files in field offices, recommended the attached SAC Letter be sent to the field.

It was decided that in those offices with less than 50 Special Agents the file should be maintained in the office of the Special Agent in Charge. In those offices with 50 or more Special Agents but with less than 100 Agents the file should be maintained in the office of the Assistant Special Agent in Charge. In those offices with 100 or more Special Agents the file should be maintained in the office of a designated field supervisor.

If approved, there is attached an SAC Letter for this purpose.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

Copy filed in 66-2554

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pmd mcJC

Covered By SAC L. #67 - 6/23/49

Attachment

CC - Mr. Mohr
Mr. Clegg

HHC:JFM:HD

RECORDED - 3 66-2542-3-435
F B I
INDEXED - 3 11 JUN 28 1949

239

63 AUG 16 1949

Copy - rze

MR. TOLSON

J. A. CARLSON

June 8, 1949

Confidential Informant Defense Information Gent

In view of the disclosure at the Coplon trial yesterday of the significance of letters in the confidential informant symbols, it is recommended that consideration be given to resymbolizing all confidential informants without the use of letters.

JAC:pc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PMD MC/JC

66-542-3

NOT RECORDED
53 JUL 30 1949

58 JUL 6 1949

186

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-542

W Confidential National Defense Informant

(C) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - (DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS) -- Gen'l.
Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 11 dated January 28, 1949, and SAC Letter No. 50, Section K, dated April 26, 1949, which emphasizes the imperative need of analyzing and expanding our confidential informant coverage. (C)(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

The Bureau desires to re-emphasize the necessity of developing new confidential informants and increasing the security in the handling of present confidential informants.

The disclosure of the identities of Bureau informants at the trial in New York City, the increasing security measures on the part of the Communist Party, USA, and the day-to-day revelations in the press of past espionage activities demand that each Agent be constantly on the alert for the development of valuable informants. (C)(U)

Consideration of the following factors should be paramount in the development of informants:

(1) Is the prospective informant in a position to furnish information of value, i.e., a well-placed stenographer or clerk may be equally as valuable as an official in a given organization. (C)(U)

(2) Does the prospective informant possess any weaknesses which would make him susceptible to approach; his personal habits, financial condition and moral outlook should be carefully considered in this regard (C)(U)

(3) Be alert for information reflecting that a prospective informant is an alien, possesses a criminal record or is in difficulty with his creditors, as these factors may possibly be utilized to induce his cooperation. (C)(U)

(4) Watch for actual signs of defection. Be alert for factional disputes in the organizational apparatus which might develop into resignations, expulsions and even disillusionment on the part of some members. (C)(U)

(5) Consider carefully the proper method of approach to the individual as the success or failure may depend on the initial contact. If it is your opinion that a third party approach is more desirable be sure to mention this in your letter to the Bureau seeking authorization for the initial contact (C)(U)

(6) Once an informant is developed, constant effort should be made to increase the value of that informant through careful planning and handling. (C)(U)

(7) You should also be on the alert to the possibility that the Communist Party, USA, will from time to time attempt to plant Communist Party members within the informant ranks of the Bureau in order to identify other Bureau informants and to penetrate Bureau operations. (C)(U)

66-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
23 JUN 10 1949

DECLASSIFIED BY ... ON ... 23-1343

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP (S) OF CLASS DATE 4-3-81 SNS

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY ... REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2 DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 3-23-86

3-23-81

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-04-950

5-31-49
SAC LETTER NO. 51
Series 1949

CONFIDENTIAL
JUN 15 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

During the course of the development of the informant and the handling thereafter, extreme security should be exercised to prevent his exposure as an informant. The various security commissions of the Communist Party, USA, have been conducting security drives to identify Bureau informants. Any individual taking notes at a meeting is suspected. Individual members of the Party have recently been given physical searches, their residences searched and other extreme measures have been utilized by the security commissions. The Agents handling confidential informants should at all times utilize vigilance and initiative and try to instil these qualities in their informants. (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842pm/mc/FC

(B) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA (DEVELOPMENT OF WITNESSES FOR DEPORTATION HEARINGS CONDUCTED BY IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE) -- Your attention is directed to SAC Letter No. 47, Section E, dated April 19, 1949, which outlines the Bureau's policy with regard to cooperation between the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau. The following information is being submitted supplementing those previous instructions.

The Bureau was advised on May 5, 1949, by Mr. Peyton Ford, The Assistant to the Attorney General, that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is badly in need of witnesses to testify at deportation hearings. INS, in addition to requiring expert witnesses who can testify to the over-all activities of the Communist Party, requires other witnesses who need not have been former top-ranking officials of the Communist Party. This latter group could be used principally for the introduction of documentary evidence. It is indicated that INS will in the future rely more on documentary evidence rather than the use of expert witnesses inasmuch as the constant use of these individuals impairs their testimony and makes them reluctant to continue to testify.

The Field Offices of the Bureau have in the past made available to INS informants in connection with Communist matters. In view of the present lack of witnesses, it is believed that many Field Offices may be contacted by INS inquiring for informants. If your office has a discontinued informant or an informant who would be of assistance to INS the loss of whom would not affect your work, his identity should be furnished to the Bureau. The Bureau will then review all of the facts concerning such informant, after which a decision will be made and you will be advised as to whether or not the identity of the informant may be disclosed to INS. Each office should use extreme care in recommending informants for disclosure to INS in order that you will not find yourselves without proper Communist coverage in your respective divisions. Before any informant is turned over to INS, you must, of course, obtain the informant's permission.

The Bureau desires to cooperate fully with INS, keeping in mind, however, the Bureau's responsibility of properly and adequately covering Communist activities.

In the Bureau's reply to Mr. Ford, it was suggested that INS first check with the appropriate Field Office of the Bureau prior to developing an individual as an informant. You should be alert for any information which reflects that this instruction is not being followed by the employees of INS. In such instances the Bureau should be promptly informed.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

NOT RECORDED
56 MAY 25 1949

57 MAY 27

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, Atlanta

July 7, 1949

Director, FBI

SEMI-ANNUAL
CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

It does not appear that the report of your national defense informants which was due on June 20, 1949, has been received at the Bureau.

The Offices receiving copies of this letter should submit the desired information as soon as possible.

cc - Baltimore

Kansas City

Louisville

JDD:mac

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PWD
mc/JC

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 7
JUL
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECORDED - 58

66-2542-3-436

45 JUL 1949

52 JUL 18 1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 25, 1949

FROM : D. M. Ladd

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR JUNE, 1949

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

The reports submitted by the field for June, 1949 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,696 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows:

Informants concerning German activities	21
Informants concerning Italian activities	9
Informants concerning Communist activities	1118
Informants concerning Japanese activities	34
Informants concerning other nationalities	192
Informants concerning general un-American activities	198
Informants concerning Atomic Energy	124
Total	1696*

*Included in the total are 219 informants of the colored race.

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-12-81 BY 2842 pmd mcJC

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SMDMC REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 22 DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91 9-15-81

JDD:mhc

EX-66

166-2542-3 - 438

RECORDED - 20

4 JUL 28 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

COPIES DESTROYED R 582 JUL 20 1961

EX-66

61 AUG 16 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ATTENTION SLIP(S) CC DATE 6/23/81 CMT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 ON 8-26-91 8-13-1943

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PMD MC

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	ATOMIC ENERGY	TOTAL
ALBANY	0	0	28	0	0	0	0	28
ANCHORAGE	0	0	7	0	8	8	0	15
ATLANTA	0	0	5(3)	0	0	5(1)	0	10(4)
BALTIMORE	0	0	14(3)	0	0	1(1)	0	15(4)
BIRMINGHAM	0	0	11(1)	0	0	1	0	12(1)
BOSTON	0	0	36(1)	0	0	2(1)	0	38(2)
BUFFALO	0	0	35(6)	0	3	0	0	38(6)
BUTTE	0	0	31	11	1	4(2)	0	47(2)
CHARLOTTE	0	0	15	0	0	7	0	22(4)
CHICAGO	1	0	90(4)	4	0	22(17)	0	117(21)
CINCINNATI	12	2	19(6)	0	3	8(7)	8	52(13)
CLEVELAND	0	0	33	0	2	2	0	37(8)
DALLAS	0	0	3(2)	0	0	0	0	3(2)
DENVER	2	0	4	4	0	0	0	10
DETROIT	0	0	50	2	14	10	0	76(15)

* Includes Rumanian, Bulgarian, Jugoslavian, etc.
** Includes Ku Klux Klan, Nationalist Action League, National Blue Star Mothers of America
() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SP1 [illegible] REASON FOR EXTENSION 1 FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 DATE OF REVIEW FOR 9-15-91 DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81

COPIES DESTROYED R 582 JUL 20 1961

46-2542-3-438

ENCLOSURE

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHERS*	UN-AMERICAN**	ATOMIC ENERGY	TOTAL
EL PASO	0	0	15(1)	0	0	0	41	56(1)
HONOLULU	0	0	25	6	2	0	0	33
HOUSTON	0	0	12	0	2	9	0	23(6)
INDIANAPOLIS	0	0	13	0	0	8	0	21(8)
KANSAS CITY	0	3	11	0	0	0	0	22(4)
KNOXVILLE	0	0	2	0	0	1	25	28
LITTLE ROCK	0	0	2	0	0	8	0	10(8)
LOS ANGELES	1	0	78(4)	0	16	6	0	101(4)
LOUISVILLE	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3(1)
MEMPHIS	0	0	17(4)	0	0	7	0	24(4)
MIAMI	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	6(2)
MILWAUKEE	1	2	23	2	18	0	0	46(5)
MOBILE	0	0	3(1)	0	0	0	0	3(1)
NEWARK	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
NEW HAVEN	0	0	36	0	0	5	0	41(4)
NEW ORLEANS	0	0	12	0	0	9	0	21
NEW YORK	0	0	36	1	59	3	0	99(4)
NORFOLK	0	0	18	0	0	1	0	19(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHERS*	UN-AMERICAN**	ATOMIC ENERGY	TOTAL
OKLAHOMA CITY	0	0	18(1)	0	0	1	0	19(1)
OMAHA	0	0	9(3)	0	0	0	0	9(3)
PHILADELPHIA	2	0	78	1	5	1	0	87(7)
PHOENIX	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9(3)
PITTSBURGH	0	0	27	0	0	6	0	33(2)
PORTLAND	0	0	18(2)	0	0	0	0	18(2)
RICHMOND	0	0	12	0	0	6	0	18(8)
ST. LOUIS	1	1	39	1	1	0	0	43(6)
ST. PAUL	0	0	23(3)	2	0	0	0	25(6)
SALT LAKE CITY	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
SAN ANTONIO	0	0	7(2)	0	1	1	0	9(2)
SAN DIEGO	0	0	6	0	0	1	0	7
SAN FRANCISCO	0	0	83	0	13	12	0	108(11)
SAN JUAN	1	0	32(10)	0	11	10(1)	0	54(11)
SAVANNAH	0	0	1	0	1	15(9)	0	17(9)
SEATTLE	0	0	33	0	1	4	50	88(3)
SPRINGFIELD	0	0	10	0	1	0	0	11(2)
WASH. FIELD	0	1	8(2)	0	30	11	0	50(2)
TOTALS	21	9	1118	34	192	198	124	1696(29)

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 30, 1949

FROM : SAC, Cincinnati

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: [redacted] b7D

CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE

CONF. INFT INFORMANT [redacted]

Confidential Informants in General Intelligence Work-

Remylet April 15, 1949.

Please refer also to my letter dated February 23, 1945, entitled [redacted] Confidential General Investigative Informant ~~RECORDING~~ Columbus, Ohio, CONF. INFT.

This is to advise that [redacted] will be carried under symbol number [redacted] and the symbol [redacted] is being cancelled. Please correct the Bureau's records accordingly.

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 DMM/JC
ON 7-17-81

RHH:MCC
66-1636
cc 66-1437

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES
DATE 10/20/81 Class BMJ

RECORDED - 5
INDEXED - 5

166-2042-3-439

F B I
12 AUG 5 1949

52 AUG 12 1949

The Director

July 25, 1949

D. M. Ladd

CONFIDENTIAL

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR JUNE, 1949

The reports submitted by the field for June, 1949 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,696 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows: (U)

Informants concerning German activities	21
Informants concerning Italian activities	9
Informants concerning Communist activities	1118
Informants concerning Japanese activities	34
Informants concerning other nationalities	192
Informants concerning general un-American activities	198
Informants concerning Atomic Energy	124
Total	1696*

*Included in the total are 219 informants of the colored race. (U)

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 DMD MCJC

JDD:mhc

mhc

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY ... EXTENSION ... REASON FOR ... FCIM, II, 1-... DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91 9-15-81

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY ... ON 6-16-94 83-1343

66-2542-3-438

SAC, Dallas 8/3/49

Director, FBI

SECURITY OF INFORMATION -
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT FILE

RECORDED - 101 440

Reurlet 7/1/49 in which you set forth the action taken, based on the instructions in SAC Letter #67, Series 1949. Your attention is invited to page 3 of SAC Letter #124, Series 1948, dated 9/8/48 which provides for the maintenance of a technical and microphone surveillance file under the supervision of the SAC or field office official in charge of technical and microphone surveillances.

The plan set forth as item #3 in your communication appears to coincide with the instructions set forth in SAC Letter #124 and authority is given to removing the correspondence described from the administrative file and placing it in a sub file to be maintained in your custody. It is not desired that this sub file be maintained in the Chief Clerk's office as suggested in your communication.

HCB:mfc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 DMC/JC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

SECTION
MAILED 4
P.M.

AUG 16 1949

HCB

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 1, 1949

FROM : SAC, Dallas

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT FILE

Reference SAC Letter 67, Series 1949.

The instructions set forth in paragraph B of referenced letter have been complied with in the following manner:

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

1. The Confidential Informant Symbol Card File has been separated from the Confidential Informant Indices and placed in the office of the SAC.

2. The name cards, which do not bear the symbol number, and which are filed alphabetically by city and by type of information, are maintained in such a manner that an agent may examine the file to locate an informant for a specific purpose. This pertains to both General and National Defense Informants.

3. The Confidential Informant administrative file, 66-156, in which correspondence regarding informants is maintained, will be stripped of serials on which the informants are identified by symbols. These serials will be placed in a sub-file and maintained in the SAC's office or labeled in the Chief Clerk's Office in such a manner that agents do not necessarily have to examine this portion of the file. This step will be held in abeyance pending receipt of Bureau approval.

The Bureau is requested to advise the Dallas Office if this procedure meets with the approval of the Bureau and is in compliance with the instructions in referenced letter.

LVD:BD
66-156

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 PMD MCJC
ON 7-17-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES

RECORDED - 101

1955 BMT 10/20/81

34 AUG 10 1949

HCB

FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: August 6, 1949

FROM : SAC, Charlotte

SUBJECT: [redacted] Pinebluff, North Carolina

INFORMANT

CONF. NATIONAL DEFENSE INFT.- GEN'L.

5615

b7D

Rebumemo 8-3-49 styled as above, pointing out that no reply has been received by the Bureau regarding a letter dated May 23, 1949 from the Bureau to the above-mentioned individual.

This is to advise that the Charlotte Division submitted a memorandum dated July 28, 1949, styled, [redacted] Pinebluff, North Carolina, Potential National Defense Confidential Informant." b7D

DEF

Since the submission of the above-mentioned memorandum, SA R. M. STEVENSON received a telephone call from [redacted] indicating that [redacted] planned to return to New York City, where he expected to contact the New York Office to furnish further information.

Review of abstracts of translations reflects NO interest to cap. sect. SGR

cc: New York

RECORDED - 136

INEDXED - 136

166-2542-3-441

F B I

23 OCT 14 1949

100-1751
CWB:fmb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PMD

COPY AND SPECIMENS RETAINED IN LAB. FOR LAB. ACTION AND REPORT

[redacted]

b7D

SEVEN-PAN

C L Web 7/15/49

51 NOV 0

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: July 28, 1949

TO : Bureau

FROM : SAC, Charlotte

SUBJECT: [redacted]
Pinebluff, North Carolina
~~Potential~~ National Defense Confidential ~~Informant~~
CONF.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE BY

b7D

7-17-81 9/23/86 2842pm MO JC

Re Bulet 5-23-49 to Charlotte.

Pursuant to the request of [redacted] Pinebluff, North Carolina, to be contacted by a representative of this Bureau in his letter to the Director dated April 11, 1949, he was interviewed and furnished information regarding individuals whom he considers to be members or fellow travelers of the Communist Party in the United States, particularly in the New York City area, which information is set out below.

Regardin[redacted]background, he advised as follows:

He is [redacted] years of age, a member of the white race, married with three small children, born in Brazil, South America of American parents, and consequently an American citizen. His father, [redacted] formerly known as [redacted] was formerly [redacted] School of Tropical Medicine at Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, until he resigned in 1913 for the purpose of going to South America to obtain information regarding tropical diseases. He is reported to be an author of several books regarding medicine and novels. His father is presently retired and is residing at Southern Pines, North Carolina. [redacted] states his father changed his name from [redacted] at the time he resigned from Tulane University.

b7D

[redacted] mother, divorced from his father, is presently married to an Enlgishman and residing in England. Her present name is [redacted] (phonetic), formerly known as [redacted] and is reported by [redacted] to have written and had published about 25 novels in the past.

b7D

[redacted] has several half-brothers, one of whom is [redacted], age [redacted], presently a trappist Monk at the Abbey of Gethsemani in Kentucky, and the author of a recent book which is his autobiography and reported to be very popular. He has another half-brother, [redacted], an author and playwriter who wrote [redacted] and also adapted the book for a movie.

1 ENCL filed with original

cc: New York City
cc: Newark

~~INDEXED~~ - 136

166-2542-3-442
NOT RECORDED
55 OCT 21 1949

Enclosure for Bureau: a number of microfilm (REGISTERED)

100-1751
RMS:AM

De-indexed this serial only. 11/3/58 39

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-3-3

copy:ans

Bureau July 28, 1949

[redacted] stated that he was reared and educated in Europe, primarily in France, and came to the United States when about 17 years of age. He is the author of a novel entitled, [redacted] published in June 1940 by Scribner and Sons, New York City, which book, according to [redacted] is fiction based upon facts of life in Moscow on the eve of the Russian Revolution. He said he obtained his material from people who were in Russia at that time, however, he stated that he has never been to Russia. [redacted] presently is writing a book entitled [redacted] under the pen name of [redacted] which is a fictional novel with a setting in Italy about 1946. b7D

[redacted] stated he was employed by the National Broadcasting Company from 1940 until about 1943 in the Shortwave International Section as a news annojncer and news analyst. He was employed in a similar capacity for the American Broadcasting Company from about 1943 to 1945, both positions being in New York City. He worked for the Columbia Broadcasting Company in Chicago from about 1945 to the latter part of 1946 when he broke a contract with Standard Oil Company for a nightly news program in order to come to Southern Pines, North Carolina, to be near his elderly father and step-mother who have been gravely ill.

[redacted] stated that whilehe was employed by the various broadcasting companies, he came in frequent contact with individuals whom he believes to be members of the Communist Party. He said an individual named [redacted] formerly with the National Broadcasting Company, Shortwave International, was a member of the Communist Party inasmuch as [redacted] himself has told him that he was a member and attempted to get him to join the Party. He said that [redacted] was in the Army during the war and was connected with the Office of War Information. He believes [redacted] is now connected with the State Department in the foreign broadcasts and is residing on Horantio Street, Greenwich Village, New York City. b7D

[redacted] related that while he was employed for the American Broadcasting Company in New York City, an individual named [redacted] was employed by the American Broadcasting Company, and [redacted] is presently in the News Room at the American Broadcasting Company in New York City as a Special Feature Reporter. [redacted] formerly lived in Hoboken, New Jersey. [redacted] said in about 1943 or 1944, [redacted] offered to introduce him to several individuals, whose names he does not recall, and to take him to several Communist meetings where he assured [redacted] that he could be convinced that he would want to join the Communist Party. He advised that the name [redacted] is not the true name of this individual as he came to this country from Poland and has a Polish name. He said [redacted] mother resides with him, and according to information furnished by [redacted] his mother is a United States Citizen only technically. b7D

[redacted] said that [redacted] used to bring Russian newspapers for him to read, and they discussed Communism frequently. According to [redacted] has told him that he was a member of the Communist Party. [redacted] stated that

copy:ahs

Bureau July 28, 1949

[redacted] held such a position with the American Boradcasting Company, that he was instrumental in having several individuals employed by the American Broadcasting Company who were members of the Communist Party. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] had him fired from his job with the American Broadcasting Company.) b7D

He advised that [redacted] is a fellow traveler if not a member of the Communist Party as [redacted] has told him of his associations with Communist Party members, and from conversations, he has gathered [redacted] is very pro-Communist. He said that [redacted] was a foreign correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company during the war and is now News Editor for the American Broadcasting Company, New York City.

[redacted] said that [redacted] who is a commentator for the American Broadcasting Company and was hired by [redacted] is strongly inclined to be a Communist as this is the impression he had obtained while being associated with [redacted] and from conversations with him.

He advised that [redacted] is suspected by him as being a Communist inasmuch as he was in frequent contact with [redacted] while employed at the National Broadcasting Company, and [redacted] was a very close friend of [redacted] [redacted] is employed at the National Broadcasting Company, New York City. b7D

[redacted] said that he has gained this knowledge concerning these individuals from conversations and associations with them.

[redacted] further adivsed that a [redacted] Vice-President in Charge of News and Special Events at the American Broadcasting Company, hired [redacted] who had no prior experience and shortly thereafter [redacted] joined the Army. He said that [redacted] was boosted to the rank of a Major or Colonel and was connected with public relations for the War Department in Washington, D. C. during the war. He said that [redacted] is partially paralized and did not see any active service.

[redacted] said that [redacted] now employed at the American Broadcasting Company in an executive capacity, has tried to get [redacted] "ousted" from the American Broadcasting Company but with no success. b7D

In addition to the above, [redacted] stated that he desired to furnish information regarding two individuals named [redacted] He said that he had been a personal friend of [redacted] for many years prior to his death in 1941 and has personally known [redacted] for at least 20 years. He advised that [redacted] lived in Italy until he came to the United States in the early 1920's to establish a residence as a result of Mussoline gaining power in Italy. He said that [redacted] set up a publishing Company in New York City and published a paper which was called

copy:ans

Bureau - July 28, 1949

"Il Martello", which translated means, "The Hammer". He stated that [redacted] maintained that he was a "Cyndicallist" (phoetic) which, in general, he said is a Socialist. He said [redacted] was anti-Russian, anti-Mussolini, and anti-Hitler. According to [redacted] married [redacted] nee [redacted], a wealthy individual from Philadelphia who is still residing in New York City. She lived with [redacted] at [redacted] (phonetic) Street, Brooklyn, New York, until his death in 1941. b7D

According to [redacted] was the former wife of [redacted] a lawyer in New York who either died or was murdered in the late 1920's, and his body was found near some railroad tracks not far from New York City.

He advised that the paper published by [redacted] was for the American-Italians in the New York City area primarily and was published to further [redacted] political ambitions to return to Italy eventually and establish his own government. He said [redacted] was a political refugee from Italy and never became a United States citizen.

[redacted] related that [redacted] was murdered on the streets in New York in either 1941 or 1942, and the case is still unsolved. He said [redacted] was shot to death in the back with a pistol, and based upon his knowledge regarding the association of [redacted] it was his opinion that [redacted] either directly or indirectly took a part in the murder, However, [redacted] said that it would be impossible to prove this fact. b7D

[redacted] said that during the late 1930's and until [redacted] death, [redacted] had open house to all his friends and acquaintances, who were mostly members of the Communist Party, and fellow travelers. He said the gatherings at [redacted] home consisted mostly of celebraties, semi-celebraties, and a large number of writers. [redacted] stated that he has been in [redacted] home on many occasions during these gatherings and recalls having seen [redacted] at his home frequently. He said [redacted] was a close friend of [redacted] but a bitter political enemy. Also the visitors included such people as [redacted] which individuals [redacted] did not identify.

With reference to [redacted] stated that [redacted] is presently the Book Editor for the New York Tribune and has had this position for many years. He said he has known [redacted] for at least 20 years personally and based upon this close association with [redacted] knows for a fact that [redacted] is a Communist and has been a Communist since about 1930. He said that he considers [redacted] an agent for the Russian Government, and one reason for this belief is the fact that [redacted] as control over the Garland Fund, which amounts to about one million dollars and was established about 1928 to aid and assist writers, artists, and authors. However, [redacted] said that none of the money has been used for this purpose and as an example

copy:ahs

Bureau -

July 28, 1949

he said his mother, [redacted] applied for a small amount years ago but was turned down. [redacted] said that [redacted] uses the Garland Fund to further the program of the Communist Party.

b7D

He said that [redacted] were friends for at least 15 or 20 years and visited each other frequently. He related that [redacted] attended a party at [redacted] home just several hours prior to being murdered, and as stated above, he believes [redacted] and the Communist Party realized that [redacted] was an enemy of the Communists and on the other hand was gaining ground in the United States among the American-Italians in his political beliefs.

It is to be noted that [redacted] stated that [redacted] secured him a job as a writer at his request during the 1930's but he did not accept the job as he discovered it was probably connected with the Communist Party. In addition, [redacted] advised that his first wife was "taken over" by [redacted] in the early 1930's, and he subsequently divorced her. (It was evident that [redacted] in furnishing the information regarding [redacted] probably may be seeking revenge to some extent, although, he was persistent in maintaining that [redacted] works directly for the Communist movement and stated that [redacted] has indicated to him that the Garland Fund is to help further the revolution in the United States.) He said his remarks concerning [redacted] have been gathered from his associations with [redacted] over a period of about 20 years.

[redacted] furnished information regarding former acquaintances of his in New York whom he said are Communist Party members. He said that [redacted] who lives in New York and believed to be employed with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service in New York, has told him that he is a member of the Communist Party and attempted to get him to join the Party in 1936 or 1937.

b7D

[redacted] related that [redacted] a painter and artist in New York, is a member of the Communist Party and isthe person responsible for getting [redacted] to join the Party. He said that from conversations and associations with [redacted] he was advised of this fact and also from his associations with [redacted] a poet in New York, and with [redacted] an artist in New York, he has been told by them that they are members of the Communist Party.

[redacted] related that he intends to have his present book completed this summer, and his present plans are that he will return to New York City in September 1949 and re-establish his residence with his family in New York. Also, he said that he plans to seek employment in New York either in radio work or work in the journalism field. He stated that most of his friends and contacts in New York City are writers and authors in the radio and newspaper fields. He stated that he would be very agreeable to renewing his acquaintances and continue to furnish information regarding

the Communist Party and members of the Party to the Bureau. He said that he could renew his contacts with [redacted] and [redacted] and through them secure valuable information regarding the Party. [redacted] volunteered that he would join the Communist Party provided it would not jeopardize his family, and also provided that he could be furnished protection in the event that in the future drastic action was taken regarding members of the Communist Party. [redacted] was explained the Bureau's policy in this regard after which he indicated that if "he was left holding the bag" he would have to give the matter further consideration. However, [redacted] stated that regardless of whether he decides to join the Communist Party, he will "string along" with those individuals who are party members and furnish whatever information he can obtain to the Bureau.

[redacted] stated he has given this matter much thought for the past two years, and he has been advised by his half-brothers to follow along with those people who can make him an outstanding author althoughthey are Communist sympathizers or members. He said that he decided to offer his services to the Bureau in view of the recent developments concerning several members of the Communist Party who are presently on trial in Federal Court. It is believed that [redacted] motive for offering himself as an Informant is to seek revenge to some degree against [redacted]

The Bureau is requested to give consideration to making [redacted] a National Defense Confidential Informant, and in the event favorable action is taken, it is suggested that the New York Office and this office be advised in order that [redacted] can be re-contacted to determine his specific plans after returning to New York City.

It is also felt that the Bureau will desire to consider initiating loyalty investigations on those individuals mentioned herein as government employees and Communist Party members.

There are enclosed herewith to the Bureau a number of microfilms that were given to the interviewing agent by [redacted] According to [redacted]

[redacted]

b7D

b7D

Subsequently, on June 17, 1949, [redacted] advised the interviewing agent by letter that hewas leaving Pinebluff, North Carolina on June 18 or 19, 1949 for New York City. He said he was going to New York for the purpose of locating a job after which he would move his family to New York. He stated that he would be living temporarily with a friend on Long Island, whose address he could not recall, however, his residence telephone number would be Virginia 925941. He also said that his wife at Pinebluff, North Carolina would know of his present address. In addition, [redacted] advised that shortly after his arrival in New York, he desired to contact the New York Office to furnish additional information regarding several unsigned letters he has received recently. b7D

No further action is being taken by this office in the absence of Bureau instructions. A copy of this letter is being designated for the Newark and New York Offices for information.

gm

SAC Letter #86
Series 1949

166-40-99

Cont. Infts In General Intelligence Work - GENERAL

(D) WITNESSES IN SECURITY MATTER CASES -- There is set forth below for your information the contents of Departmental Circular No. 4100 to all United States Attorneys, which was dated August 1, 1949:

"It is hereby directed that witnesses subpoenaed in any case involving security matters shall not be released without the approval of the Department of Justice until the proceeding in which the witnesses have been subpoenaed has been concluded.

"In any procedure relating to security matters, United States Attorneys and their Assistants are cautioned that they are not to interview or subpoena confidential informants of the Federal Bureau of Investigation without prior consultation and consent of the Department of Justice."

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-12-81 BY 2842 pmd mcjc

166-2542-3-V
NOT RECORDED
47 SEP 14 1949

237
63 SEP 16 1949

REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO.

August 18, 1949

BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 41
Series 1949

(A) LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES - REPORTS --

1. Use of T Symbols

The Bureau has of late noted an increasing tendency upon the part of the field to use more and more T informants in Loyalty of Government Employees reports. It is self evident that the indiscriminate use of T informants decreases the value of the reports and greatly augments the responsibilities of those charged with weighing and evaluating information contained therein. It is therefore desired that the use of T informants be restricted to the following classes of informants:

a. Sensitive government agencies. These include Army, Navy, Air, Central Intelligence, State Department, and the Civil Service Commission.

b. Established Bureau informants whose identity must be protected.

c. Persons interviewed who specifically request anonymity.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842 pmd mc/JC

2. Contacts with Established Informants

With respect to information attributed to established Bureau informants, it is necessary that extreme care be used in the wording of information attributed to them. Where they have positive information of value to report, in addition to the problem of concealment of the informant, it is imperative that the report not reflect or imply information not actually in the informant's possession. For instance, if the informant has information concerning a person with a same or similar name and no other identifying data, the report should clearly reflect that the informant does not know whether his information relates to the government employee in question. Particular care must be exercised where the informant in question is not in a position to know the employee or amplify the information originally reported by the informant. Under no circumstances should inferences or conclusions be drawn by the reporting agent as to the meaning of information.

166-2542-3-1
NOT RECORDED
53 AUG 19 1949

It has also been noted that negative information from established informants is frequently reported in such a manner as to indicate that these informants possess all inclusive knowledge of Communist Party membership and activities within a particular area. This serves to negate or render doubtful any information which may have been secured from highly confidential sources or other informants, concerning whose authenticity no question exists. For example, to quote one informant as saying an employee was or is a member of the Communist Party and in the same report quote other informants "who are reliable and thoroughly familiar with Communist Party activities" in that area as saying that they did not know and had never heard of the employee casts a doubt upon the positive information. Accordingly, informants to whom such negative information is attributed should be described in a manner which would show the limitations of their knowledge, or that they are acquainted only with certain phases of Communist Party membership or activities.

Confidential National Defense Informants Serial

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-03-1003

60 AUG 24 1949

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ... SLIP(S) OF Class
DATE 10/26/81 BMJ

New York 7, New York

September 30, 1949

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 ... ON 7-17-81 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

Re: [redacted]
CONF. ~~POTENTIAL~~ NATIONAL DEFENSE
CONFIDENTIAL ~~INFORMANT~~ - Genl.
(Bureau file [redacted])

b7D

Dear Sir:

Re Charlotte letter dated July 28, 1949 captioned as above.

[redacted] was investigated by this office (New York file 123-2348) as an applicant. Reference is therefore made to the report of SA F. DONALD REDINGTON, September 6, 1949, at New York, entitled [redacted] Special Inquiry, State Department, Public Law 402 80th Congress, Voice of America". It should be noted that background information concerning [redacted] was set out in the Charlotte letter dated July 28, 1949.

b7D

[redacted] at the present time is residing at Primrose Farm, Congers Road, New City, New York. At the present time, [redacted] is unemployed and is expected to receive an appointment with the Voice of America, State Department.

On September 7, 1949, [redacted] voluntarily personally appeared at the New York Office to furnish information on persons he considers to be connected in some way with the Communist Party. [redacted] stated that through his many years in broadcasting and journalistic fields and as a result of personal contact especially in this field of endeavor, he considers both [redacted] noted newspaperman connected with the "New York Herald-Tribune" and [redacted] Hollywood writer, to be Communists and is willing to testify that they are Communists. During this first interview, [redacted] stated that if he does not receive a position with the Voice of America, he will be forced to take his family to England and work for the British Broadcasting Company.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-3-30 #9

cc: 123-2348

~~INDEXED~~ - 136 | 66-2542-3-443
NOT RECORDED
55 OCT 20 1949

KWB:LS
62-10070

De-indexed this serial only. 11/3/58

ORIGINAL

[redacted] explained that he cannot obtain a position in the broadcasting field in this country without being aided by Communists in this field with whom he is acquainted. [redacted] stated that he refuses to accept employment on these conditions.

b7D

[redacted] stated that he is convinced that various people in this field have been trying to convert him to Communism for many years. He stated that he has reached the point in his life where he feels he must expose these people who have affected his career. [redacted] mentioned that he may attempt to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities to expose these people in the broadcasting field if he does not receive a position in this country in radio. [redacted] stated that the people whom he knows or believes to be Communists in the broadcasting field have no idea that he has reported them to the FBI. As a matter of fact, he states, they are not aware that he is strongly anti-Communistic.

On September 13, 1949, [redacted] voluntarily returned to the New York Office to furnish the identity of the people whom he believes to be Communists or Communist Party sympathizers. [redacted] stated that he has maintained this list of names in his possession for some time and wanted the names on file with the Bureau for our information. [redacted] indicated that he would be willing to testify against those people who made the statement to him that they were Communists. [redacted] furnished the following names; each one, according to [redacted] admitted to him that he or she was a Communist:

1 [redacted] -connected with ABC Newsroom; last seen by SCOTT in 1945.

b7D

2. [redacted] -an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; last seen by SCOTT approximately 4 years ago.

3. [redacted] believes he possesses a true Polish name but cannot recall the same) an ABC employee whose mother is alleged to have a highly important position in the Communist Party.

4 [redacted] -connected with NBC and also was employed as an Army historian at Governors Island, New York, New York.

5. [redacted] -connected with NBC and now may be in the service of the State Department.

6. [redacted]—connected with NBC (German Section) who has refused to take a job in the State Department because his Communist connections were known. b7D

Concerning the above people, [redacted] stated he has not been associated with these people for the past year or more and he is not aware of their present location.

7 [redacted]—connected with the "New Yorker" magazine, and President of the Radio Writers Guild, never admitted to [redacted] that he was a Communist Party member, but from conversation and observation on SCOTT'S part, he believes LYON is a Communist sympathizer.

8. [redacted]—a writer who testified at the [redacted] perjury trial at New York, is a reformed fellow traveler. [redacted] that he knew [redacted] very well and had met him through [redacted] stated that any of [redacted] immediate friends, in his opinion, would be fellow travelers or Party members.

9 [redacted] and [redacted]—brothers and both writers for the "Saturday Review of Literature" on a part-time basis. [redacted] stated that these two people never admitted to him being members of the Communist Party but considers both of them Communist sympathizers as a result of past conversations had with them when he knew them through [redacted] stated that he has not seen them for the past two years or more. b7D

10. [redacted]—former ABC employee and now associated with CBS, who admitted to [redacted] that he was a Communist Party member. [redacted] stated that he has not seen [redacted] for some time.

11. [redacted]—Vice President in charge of publicity and news for ABC, who is a wealthy individual according to [redacted] stated he considers this person a strong fellow traveler and Party sympathizer and that [redacted] received his first job with ABC to the intercession of [redacted]

12. [redacted] and his wife, [redacted]—According to [redacted] was with the New York City Board of Education but even though he never admitted to [redacted] that he was a Communist Party member, [redacted] considers him a strong fellow traveler and Party sympathizer since both husband and wife were intimate friends of [redacted]

13. [redacted] connected with the "New York Herald-Tribune" newspaper who according to [redacted] helped write "One World" for [redacted] stated that BARNES admitted to him that he was a Communist. b7D

14. [redacted] attorney at law, [redacted] New York, New York. [redacted] stated that [redacted] is a Communist Party sympathizer and an intelligent man who may be the victim of influence by his friend [redacted] stated he never heard [redacted] admit being a Communist but in [redacted] opinion, [redacted] was a sympathizer. According to [redacted] he met [redacted] not too long ago and [redacted] indicated to [redacted] that he, through his connections, could get [redacted] a job in the State Department, Voice of America, without any hindrance. [redacted] stated, however, that he did not give any encouragement to [redacted] to push him for this job.

15. [redacted] a writer and novelist who admitted to being a fellow traveler and Communist sympathizer to [redacted] some years ago. b7D

16. [redacted] a poet who, according to [redacted] also admitted that he was a fellow traveler and Communist sympathizer. [redacted] stated that he has not seen [redacted] or [redacted] for some time.

17. [redacted] and [redacted] writers. According to [redacted] both of these people he considers to be Communist sympathizers since they are also friends of [redacted].

18. [redacted] a writer reported by [redacted] to be a Communist sympathizer. [redacted] remarked that [redacted] is another one of the clique with [redacted]

19. [redacted] a writer whom [redacted] believes to be a fellow traveler and sympathizer. b7D

20. [redacted] a teacher at the College of Brownville, New York, whom [redacted] considers to be a Communist sympathizer. [redacted] according to [redacted] is reported to be Russian.

21. [redacted] a writer reported by [redacted] to be of Russian extraction and one whom he considers capable of engaging in Russian espionage activities in this country. [redacted] stated that he considers [redacted] to be a Communist sympathizer.

22. [redacted]—a writer reported by [redacted] to be a fellow traveler and Communist sympathizer. b7D

23. [redacted]—a writer also reported by [redacted] to be a fellow traveler and Communist sympathizer.

24. [redacted]—a writer who, according to [redacted] admitted to him that he was a Communist.

25. [redacted]—a writer who also admitted to [redacted] that he was a Communist.

26. [redacted] and [redacted]—wife and husband reported by [redacted] to be fellow travelers and Communist sympathizers. [redacted] stated that he has seen these people recently and has conversed with them. [redacted], according to [redacted] is an expert on Hebrew literature and he is connected at the present time with CBS. Both [redacted] are very friendly with [redacted] stated that [redacted] advised him that he would get a job at the Voice of America, State Department, regardless of any obstacles if [redacted] behaved himself and became friendly with [redacted]. b7D

27. [redacted]—former wife of [redacted] who was murdered on the East Side of New York City some years ago. [redacted] is now under the influence of [redacted] and he believes that she is a fellow traveler and Communist sympathizer.

It should be noted that [redacted] advised that he has not seen a great number of these people in the last two years or more since he has been out of New York City for this period of time. [redacted] stated he had met most of them as a result of his past employment with ABC or NBC and that the allegations he made about these people were as a result of observation on his part or admissions made by these people. [redacted] was unable to produce any factual evidence to back up his allegations. b7D

At the time of [redacted] last visit to the New York Office, he admitted to the interviewing agent that he was financially "hard-up" and he is finding it difficult to support his wife and children and that he has been receiving some financial assistance from his wife's family. [redacted] stated that [redacted] is friendly with most of the above-mentioned people and in his

b7D

opinion, [redacted] is the type of person who is a "behind-the-scene Communist Party member". He stated that [redacted] has such an influence in his field of endeavor that he can "blackball" anyone who does not conform with his way of thinking. [redacted] stated that he has seen [redacted] within the past few months but has refused to receive any assistance from [redacted] in seeking employment in the broadcasting field. It should be noted that [redacted] has a definite desire to expose [redacted] as a Communist and it was apparent that this feeling of unfriendliness may partially exist from personal difficulties. [redacted] was supposed to have taken away [redacted] first wife. However, [redacted] did remark that he is not angry with [redacted] as a result of any family difficulties but is interested in exposing him for what he really is, stating that he is a Communist.

[redacted] stated that during the time he worked in the field of broadcasting, he was told by a few of his fellow employees that he suffered from a Communist complex. [redacted] remarked that he was at one time greatly suspicious of many people but that his suspicions of people being Communists were as a result of conversations had with them.

b7D

[redacted] stated that he is very friendly with [redacted] and may ask [redacted] assistance in the future to arrange for him to appear as a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. However, he would not take any action in this line until he ascertained whether he would receive the job with the Voice of America.

It should be noted that at the time [redacted] appeared at the New York Office on September 13, 1949, he received a phone call from his wife that a notice had been received at his home advising him to appear at the Voice of America Office that afternoon. [redacted] after furnishing the above information, departed directly for the Voice of America Office. It was apparent [redacted] expected to receive some word concerning his appointment to a position at the Voice of America.

On September 15, 1949, this office was in receipt of a letter from [redacted] advising an agent of this office that if his application for a position should be approved by the Voice of America, State Department, he would be reluctant to attract any notoriety as an employee of the State Department and that his thought of going to the House Committee on Un-American Activities was founded on the assumption that his chances of being accepted by the State Department are slim. [redacted] stated in his letter that he would take no steps in

going before the House Committee without first advising this office.

[redacted] was advised at the time he appeared at the New York Office that this office could not advise him one way or another whether he should appear before any House Committee to report on Communist activities or to identify people as Communists. [redacted] stated that he was aware that the Bureau would not be able to make any recommendations to him concerning what actions to take and that he would have to decide for himself whether he should appear as a witness.

b7D

A review of the indices of this office revealed numerous references on the individuals mentioned herein and the Bureau will be advised of the results of this review by seperate communication.

The above is being furnished for the Bureau's information.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD SCHEIDT, SAC

OCT 16 1950
Eft

66-2542-3-444

CHANGED TO

100-365248- ✓ (10/20/49)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PMD mcsc

C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 DJD MCJC

DEC 9 1949
NWK

66-2542-3-445

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-5-743X

140

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pmD
mc/JC

66-2542-3-446

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-16-299

lt 264

4-528

66-2542-3-447

CHANGED TO

105-134830-X8

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 Pnd Jmc/JC

AUG 2 1967

pr 1 Bt

SAC, Chicago

December 8, 1949

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

RECORDED 66-2542-3-448

Reurlet November 16, 1949, suggesting that consideration be given to the use as informants of individuals on Communist matters who are pro-Tito.

In considering any individual as an informant on Communist matters a strong nationalistic allegiance such as you suggest should be kept in mind. It should also be considered, however, that Titoites claim to be good Communists and though an individual swears allegiance to Tito, he is undoubtedly Communistic in thought.

It is suggested that in considering individuals of Slovac descent as informants, great care be exercised in screening them to determine their true allegiance and whether pro- or anti-Tito. It should also be kept in mind the ideology in both cases may be Communist. Therefore, in connection with the suggestion submitted by your office in reference letter, it is desired that you keep the above observations in mind. The Bureau does not desire, however, that your office undertake a project of considering the development as informants of any particular group of individuals who are known to be pro-Tito. It is noted that you state there are several individuals in the Chicago Division who are known to be definitely anti-Stalin. If you have any particular individual in mind whom you feel to be potential informant material, you should consider sending the complete background concerning such individual to the Bureau, together with your recommendation as to possible development of the individual as an informant. The Bureau will not entertain any recommendation looking toward the development of a subject as an informant when the only information indicating that the subject might be favorable to a contact by Bureau Agents is the fact that he is anti-Stalin and pro-Tito.

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 PMDMCJC
ON 7-17-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND ... CLASS
DATE 10/20/81 BMJ

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

JDD:jmf:td

80 DEC 19 1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: November 16, 1949

FROM : SAC, Chicago

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS - General

In connection with the development of informants regarding Communist activities, Supervisor WILLIAM L. RYAN has suggested that consideration be given to the possibility that excellent informants could be developed on Communist matters through the utilization of Communists who are pro-Tito. Such individuals, of course, would be normally of Yugoslav extraction.

It is pointed out that many of these individuals are definitely anti-Stalin at this time and it has been observed that in the Chicago Division members of the Communist Party have been expelled because of their pro-Tito sympathies.

It is known that there are several individuals in the Chicago Division who are members of various Communist front groups but who are definitely anti-Stalin. While it is true that these individuals are Communists, nonetheless it is felt that there is a distinct possibility that these individuals could be utilized as informants in order to secure information regarding Communists who are pro-Stalin.

WLR:lab

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PMD MCJC

Whitson

memo Chicago
12-8-49
JDP, jry

RECORDED - 33 166-2542-3-448
F B I
3 DEC 13 1949

THE DIRECTOR

August 2, 1949

THE [illegible] CONFERENCE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842PMJMC/JC

At the Executives Conference on August 1, 1949, Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Mohr, Carlson, Clegg, Nease, Rosen and Fletcher being in attendance, a question was raised relating to investigation of subversive activities at educational institutions. Instructions now outstanding require the field to obtain Bureau authority to make an investigation of any student, faculty member or organization on the campus of any educational institution. Instructions also require that prior to an interview with any student, faculty member or employee of an educational institution that Bureau authority be obtained.

It was pointed out that a number of the offices have established informants in educational institutions and from time to time are developing new confidential informants, and it was suggested to the Conference that it was proper for the field offices to utilize the established informants without securing Bureau authority in each instance even though they were students, faculty members or employees of an educational institution.

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that when the Bureau authorizes an investigation of a student, faculty member, employee, or organization at any educational institution that it would be proper at that time to authorize the field to conduct the investigation and utilize all reliable sources of information, established contacts and informants, including those actually connected with the educational institution.

If you agree, in letters authorizing investigations in the future at educational institutions the field will be informed that authority is granted to utilize established informants and contacts at educational institutions. The field will be advised that Bureau authority must be obtained prior to contacting a student, faculty member or employee who is not carried as an established informant of a particular field division.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

cc: Mr. H. H. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

HD:mcr

66-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
45 NOV 28 1949

Original copy filed in

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: November 3, 1949

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, OKLAHOMA CITY

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES, - ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING, AND RELATED MATTERS

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 97, Series 1949, dated October 19, 1949, which contains information concerning the contents and appearance of Security Index Cards.

For purposes of uniformity and in an effort to save agent and stenographic time, it has been suggested that a form Security Index Card might be prepared containing the information set forth in referenced letter. Much of the information required on the front of the Security Index Card could appear on a form and would require little typing in the field. With regard to the reverse side of the Security Index Card, it has been suggested that in addition to the information contained in the uniform field photograph stamp a notation might be made in a form Security Index Card requesting information such as the subject's possession of firearms or his potential dangerousness.

It is also suggested that a form Confidential National Defense Informants Card Gen'l. bearing pertinent information be prepared since it is felt this would also save agent and stenographic time in the field.

The above suggestions are submitted for the Bureau's consideration.

WHS:VS
100-00

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-17-81 BY 2842 [illegible]

66-2542-3 -
NOT RECORDED
75 MAR 7 1950

57 MAR 7 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-6200-100-1100

CONFIDENTIAL

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

SAC LETTER NO. 112
Series 1949

December 20, 1949

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER, TOLSON, CLEGG, CONNELLEY, GLAVIN, HARBO, LADD, NICHOLS, ROSEN, TRACY, BAUMGARDNER, BOSWELL, CALLAHAN, CALLAN, CARLSON, CARTWRIGHT, CONRAD, DOWNING, EDWARDS, H. L., EGAN, FEENEY, FLETCHER, GURNEA, JONES, M. A., KEAY, LAUGHLIN, LEONARD, LONG, McCABE, E. J., McCABE, N. H., McGUIRE, McINTIRE, MOBLEY, MOHR, NANNA, NAUGHTEN, NEASE, PARSONS, PENNINGTON, RENNEBERGER, ROGERS, SCOTT, SIZOO, TAMM, Q., WAIKART, WALL, WHITSON AND SUPERVISORS

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF CLASS DATE 10/20/81 BMJ

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMJ/mc JO
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.2 2/3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91 7-17-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON 6-16-94 83-1343

(A) COMMUNIST PARTY - CHINA; COMMUNIST PARTY - U.S.A. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT COVERAGE -- Recent information available to the Bureau indicates that several individuals have entered the United States from China as underground representatives of the Chinese Communists. The allegations reflect that highly placed Chinese Communists are among this group and will, in the event of recognition, take over Chinese Diplomatic, Consular and United Nations Posts. Also it is indicated that the group will conduct a concerted effort to recruit Chinese students and other Chinese into the Communist Party. It is further reported that the Communist Party, U.S.A. and the Chinese Communist Party are in close liaison regarding plans for infiltrating and influencing the Chinese organizations and communities in the United States The purported plans include the expenditure of $15,000,000 by the Communist Party, U.S.A. for the recruitment of Chinese students and the payment of bribes of $200 per month for active membership in the Communist Party. The Bureau's investigation to date also indicates that some of these individuals obtained fraudulent entry into this country. (U)

The recent gains of the Communists in China as well as the active agitation by Chinese Communist agents and the Communist Party, U.S.A. makes it inevitable that there are in this country persons of Chinese racial extraction who may, under present circumstances, have undergone a change in political sympathies and may now have begun to work actively for the Chinese Communist cause. The Bureau desires that all offices be alert to report and investigate the activities of these individuals and that they be considered in connection with the Bureau's security index program. (U) 6-2542-3

NOT RECORDED
88 DEC 29 1949

This information also serves to point up the necessity for all offices to reconsider and reevaluate the need for informant coverage among persons of Chinese racial extraction. It is indicated that there will be

Conf. inft in general Intelligence work. gen.

66-04-1041

ORIGINAL FILED

CONFIDENTIAL

58 JAN 4 1950

an increasing use for this type of informants, not only for the proper investigation of individual cases but for the desired coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, U.S.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

Every effort should therefore be made by all field divisions to establish reliable and confidential informants among these groups. Caution should, however, be exercised to periodically reevaluate these informants due to the strong influences which can be exerted on these individuals.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-13-2014

F65M72K70

SECRET

New York, New York

CONFIDENTIAL

7-6-93
Classified by 9803RDD/bjs
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 DMC JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2/3
FCIM, II, 1-4.2
DATE OF EXTENSION FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91
7-17-81

November 25, 1949
CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Director, FBI

Re: [redacted] b7D
POTENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT
(Bureau file 123-3463)

Dear Sir:

Re my letter September 30, 1949, stating that the Bureau would be advised of information in the files of the New York Office concerning the individuals mentioned by [redacted]

The purpose of this letter is to summarize the more pertinent references in the files of this office concerning the persons accused by [redacted] of being Communists or fellow travelers.

The New York files fail to reflect any record for the following individuals on the basis of information furnished by [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES
CLASS AM
DATE 10/20/81

The following are summaries of the information in the files of this office on the individuals named below:

[redacted] 5/19/97 CLASSIFIED BY Sp7 ci/GAJ DECLASSIFY ON: 1/16

This office has a closed file on [redacted] reflecting an investigation of [redacted] by the New York City Police Department based upon b7D

SECRET

Deindexed this serial only. 10/3/58

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-8-94

CJM:NJG
62-10070

60 JAN 2 - 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

a complaint received on January 8, 1941 from [redacted] that [redacted] was a well known Communist. The Police Department investigation failed to reflect any evidence of Communist Party membership. The March 13, 1948 issue of the "New York Journal American" contained a colum by [redacted] PEGLER which was devoted to [redacted] membership and activities in Communist fronts. [redacted] column stated that [redacted] was mentioned 17 times in "Committee Print Appendix, Part IX, Communist Front Organizations," published by the Government Printing Office in 1944. The files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted] has been active in the American Russian Institute, Russian War Relief, American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, and other organizations.

b7D

[redacted] is a subject of a case entitled, "[redacted] was; INTERNAL SECURITY - C" (Bureau file 100-24499; New York file 100-80918). [redacted] was one of the "Hollywood Ten" who were convicted of contempt for refusing to tell the House Committee on Un-American Activities whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party. The files of this office reflect that [redacted] has been active in the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges, National Committee for People's Rights, Schappes Defense League, American Russian Institute, and other front organizations.

[redacted]

b7D

On September 19, 1944, Confidential Informant [redacted] reported a conversation between [redacted] of the NMU and [redacted] LEWIN of the Blue Network, NBC. This conversation related to LEWIN'S requesting [redacted] to start a letter-writing campaign in order to get an employee by the name of [redacted] discharged for reading a script on the air without first submitting it to LEWIN for approval. (U)

[redacted]

The files of this office reflect that [redacted] is a subject of a case entitled, [redacted]; Special Assistant to the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES" (Bureau file 101-205). During the course of this investigation, informant stated that [redacted] had been either a Communist Party member or a sympathizer. [redacted] was also the subject of a case entitled, [redacted] was; INTERNAL SECURITY - R, HATCH ACT" (Bureau file 101-205). During the course of this investigation, informants related that MANGIONE had written articles for the "Daily Worker" and had either been a Communist Party member or sympathizer.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

By letter dated October 20, 1949, entitled, [redacted] United States Department of State, New York, New York: LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES" the Bureau requested background data on [redacted] Results of the New York indices search on [redacted] will be reported to the Bureau in a separate communication under the above loyalty caption.

b7D

[redacted]

By letter dated March 28, 1942, the Bureau advised that [redacted], alias [redacted], who was applying for a position with NBC, left Germany on the arrival of Hitler and subsequently settled in France and joined the French Ministry of Propaganda. [redacted] is the subject of a Pending case entitled, [redacted] VOA - Special Inquiry, State Department." This case was recently discontinued on Bureau instructions and background data on [redacted] will be submitted to the Bureau in an RUC report in the above captioned VOA matter.

b7D

[redacted]

The files of this office reflect that by letter dated January 17, 1944 entitled, [redacted]; Office of War Information; INTERNAL SECURITY, HATCH ACT", the New York Office advised the Bureau of a meeting held at the home of PETER LYON, 57 West 12th Street, New York City, which was attended by [redacted] It is not known whether this [redacted] is identical with the person mentioned by [redacted], New York City, is known to have sent a communication to Governor DEWEY in 1943 urging the release of [redacted] The files of this office reflect that [redacted] has been listed as a sponsor or otherwise identified with the League of American Writers, Reichstag Fire Trial Anniversary Committee, Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, and the People's Radio Foundation. (u)

[redacted]

[redacted] is the subject of a case entitled, [redacted] Special Inquiry, OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT." This investigation reflected that [redacted] had been a member of a number of organizations reportedly controlled by Communists, and had registered as a Communist voter in 1936. By letter dated July 15, 1949 entitled, [redacted]; SECURITY MATTER - C" the New York Office advised the Bureau of [redacted] testimony in the [redacted] perjury trial and the fact that numerous entries in a memo book of

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] indicated a highly antagonistic attitude toward the FBI. The files of this office reflect that [redacted] was a sponsor or otherwise identified with the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, National Committee for People's Rights, Spanish Refugee Relief Camp, League of American Writers, Committee Defending Rights of Communists to be on Ballot, American Committee for Democratic and Intellectual Freedom and other organizations. b7D

[redacted]

On February 25, 1949, [redacted] partner in the law firm of Marshall, Bratter, Seligson & Klein, 150 Broadway, New York City, advised an agent of this office that he is a member of the Board of Education, New York City, and was formerly an advisor of a delegation on the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

On April 6, 1941 former Confidential Informant [redacted] stated that [redacted] a well known Communist fellow traveler, had a brother, [redacted], who was [redacted] of the Board of Higher Education in New York.

The "Daily Worker" issue of September 28, 1942, Page 2, Column 6, listed [redacted] lawyer, as one of a group of signers of a petition to President ROOSEVELT urging him to act to gain political freedom for India. [redacted] was a member of the National Lawyers Guild in 1940. One [redacted] was listed as a member of the Advisory Board of the New Jersey Labor School, also known as WALT WHITMAN School of Social Science in 1945. b7D

The "New York Times" issue of March 31, 1946 reflected that [redacted] spoke before the annual conference of the Association of Teachers of Social Studies of New York, and urged Russia and the United States to pull aside "curtains" that keep them from understanding each other. Confidential Informant ND BOS TS 216 advised that one [redacted], New York City, had been considered as a possible speaker on the aims and purposes of UNESCO before a meeting of the American Association of Scientific Workers. One [redacted] is [redacted] of the ROBERT MARSHALL Civil Liberties Trust Fund [redacted]

The files of this office reflect that [redacted] has been a sponsor or otherwise identified with the American Society for Cultural Relations with Russia Book Committee, National Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners, Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, Citizens United to Abolish the Wood-Rankin Committee, American Russian Institute, and other organizations.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Letter to Director, FBI
NY 62-10070

[redacted]

b7D

Confidential Informant [redacted] stated that CARL VAN DOREN was a member of the Friends of Italian Democracy in July, 1947. The files of this office reflect that [redacted] has been active as a speaker before meetings of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee and has been a sponsor or otherwise identified with Artists Front to Win the War, American Society for Cultural Relations with Russia Book Committee, National Federation of Constitutional Liberties, Citizens United to Abolish the Wood-Rankin Committee, American Relief for Greek Democracy, and other organizations. (4)

[redacted] is a subject of a case entitled, [redacted] Office of the Co-ordinator of Information, Employee Investigation" Bureau file 77-23027. This investigation failed to reflect any subversive activities on [redacted] part. The April 19, 1948 issue of the "Voice of Freedom" published by the Voice of Freedom Committee, contained an article lauding [redacted] Radio Commentator, CBS, for his "courage and honesty" and said that he was to be honored by the newspaper guild for his radio program. This article requested readers to write to CBS supporting [redacted]

b7D

The February 27, 1942 issue of "PM" contains an article by [redacted] attacking the Dies Committee for labeling people Communists merely because they belonged to an organization which the Dies Committee terms a Communist front organization. By letter dated June 24, 1945, in the case entitled, "SODAC, NEW YORK CITY; INTERNAL SECURITY - R," the Bureau was advised of a telephone conversation between one [redacted] (ph.) and [redacted] of the USSR Consulate in New York. This conversation was in the Russian language. By letter dated July 13, 1945 the Bureau advised that the record of OWI did not indicate that [redacted] spoke Russian, thereby indicating that he was not identical with the person who spoke to [redacted] (4) (U)

[redacted] was a subject of a case entitled, [redacted] Office of Co-ordinator of Information, Editorial Applicant, SPECIAL INQUIRY." On March 19, 1942, ONI, New York City, advised that [redacted] supports the Communist leadership of the New York Newspaper Guild and is either a member of the Communist Party or a close sympathizer [redacted] is also the subject

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in a case entitled, [redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY - HATCH ACT" (Bureau file 100-38309). The files of this office also reflect that [redacted] was a member of the Board of Directors of the American Russian Institute and a sponsor of Russian War Relief. b7D

[redacted]

One [redacted] New York City, was on the mailing list of the National Federation of Constitutional Liberties in 1941. The files of this office also reflect that [redacted] has been a sponsor or otherwise identified with the American League for Peace and Democracy, American Civil Liberties Union, Lawyers Committee on American Relations with Spain, Committee of Cultural Relations with Latin America, League of American Writers, and other organizations. b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] On March 30, 1942, ONI, New York City, stated that [redacted] was a member of the National Committee of the Civil Rights Defense Committee, a club organized to aid the followers of [redacted], who had been tried for sedition in Minneapolis. The files of this office also reflect that [redacted] has been a sponsor or otherwise identified with the National Committee for People's Rights, Artists Front to Win the War, Congress of American Soviet Friendship, American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, National Council of American Soviet Friendship, Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, American Relief for Greek Democracy, Inc., Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and similar organizations.

[redacted]

On April 27, 1944, a highly confidential source advised that one [redacted], Bronx, New York City, was a member of the Child Car Committee, Burnside Club, Communist Party. It is not known whether this [redacted] is identical with the person named by [redacted]. It should be noted that [redacted] is also the name of the wife of [redacted]

[redacted]

The files of this office reflect that [redacted] has been a sponsor or otherwise identified with the Congress of American Soviet Friendship, League of American Writers, American Committee for the Protection

SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

of the Foreign Born, Spanish Refugee Relief Camp, National Council of American Soviet Friendship, American Russian Cultural Association, Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Committee for Medical Aid to the Soviet Union, Inc., and other organizations.

Confidential Informant [redacted] stated that [redacted] was one of the speakers at the 10th Anniversary of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade held on February 12, 1947 at the Hotel Astor, New York City. [redacted] was also on the National Reception Committee for Madam Curie at a dinner given by the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee in the Hotel Astor, New York City, on March 31, 1948. On September 23, 1941, Confidential Informant [redacted] stated that in a recent conversation [redacted] had told the informant that [redacted] had broken off ties with the Communists. [redacted]

b7D

Files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted] was Vice-Chairman of the Civil Rights Defense Committee in 1942 and was a sponsor or otherwise identified with the League of Professional Group for Foster and Ford, National Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners, Non-Partisan Committee for Defense of [redacted], American Civil Liberties Union, and other organizations.

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted] is a subject of a case entitled, [redacted] SECURITY MATTER - C" (Bureau file 100-91667). In May, 1949, during an interview with Bureau agents in connection with [redacted] Case, [redacted] advised that although he had been very much in favor of Communism during the early 1930's, he has since become disillusioned with Communism.

[redacted]

[redacted] was guest of honor at the United Nations in America dinner given by the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born on April 17, 1943. Information furnished by Washington Field Office Confidential Informant [redacted] stated that [redacted], an author and lecturer, made an appointment to call on [redacted] at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., at 10:00 a.m. January 17, 1947. On January 17 agents of the Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Field Office observed an unidentified individual enter the Soviet Embassy at 10:00 a.m. and depart at 11:45 a.m., and it is believed that this individual was identical with [redacted] The Los Angeles Office stated that the name of [redacted] was included in a list of names maintained by [redacted] National Director of the Civil Rights Congress. The 1940 issue of "Current Biography" reflects that in 1930 and 1933 [redacted] accompanied [redacted] to Russia and with the latter filmed "Russia as it Was, Russia as it is Today," a picture history of Russian progress. (U) b7D

[redacted]

On May 10, 1944, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee sponsored a dinner held at the Biltmore Hotel, New York City. Confidential Informant [redacted] was present at this function and reported that [redacted] noted publisher and author, paid tribute to the underground forces of the world working against the overthrow of Fascism, and also criticized elements in the United States for red baiting. The files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted] has been a sponsor or otherwise identified with the National Committee for People's Rights, Congress of American Soviet Friendship, American Committee for Spanish Freedom, New York Conference for Inalienable Rights, and other organizations. (U)

On June 3, 1947, [redacted] New York City, exhibited a resume prepared by an anti-Communist group in the Actors Equity Association. [redacted] said that [redacted] was a committee member and a patron of the [redacted] Memorial Committee, along with many other Communists or Communist fellow travelers. b7D

[redacted]

One [redacted] is the subject of a case entitled, [redacted] SPECIAL INQUIRY, Office of Co-ordinator of Information." It is not known whether or not this individual is identical with the person named by [redacted] The name of [redacted] New York City appeared on the National Federation of Constitutional Liberties mailing list in 1941. (U)

[redacted]

On April 2, 1943, G-2, New York City, advised that during a survey of waterfront meeting places of marine personnell, the following information was obtained: "At the Mautkeller Tavern, 13th Street and 3rd Avenue, New York City, a [redacted] who claimed respectively

"to be an artist and a writer, exhibited a considerable interest in shipping matters. They were heard to state that they were intimately associated with [redacted] who was employed by the newspaper "PM." They also stated that they knew all about the Casablanca landing long before it occurred." The G-2 report said tha[redacted] was alleged to be a member of the Communist Party, the Writers School and the NMU. It is not known whether or not the above [redacted] is identical with the person mentioned by [redacted] One [redacted], of [redacted] New York City, was a member of the American Artists Congress in 1941.

[redacted]

On July 29, 1944 and November 27, 1944, this office received information from the Office of Censorship that [redacted], widow of [redacted], was a Trotzkyist and a member of the Civil Rights Defense Committee and the International Rescue and Relief Committee.

For the Bureau's information, [redacted] has made subsequent visits to the New York Office and it now appears that he is suffering from a well developed, deep-rooted persecution complex and labors under the impression that Communists and fellow travelers in the radio industry, including [redacted] are responsible for [redacted] difficulty in obtaining employment in the radio industry. Information furnished by [redacted] indicates that his mother is apparently insane and that [redacted] blames [redacted] for her mental disintegration. [redacted] also believes that the Communists and fellow travelers mentioned by him intend to perform some bodily harm on himself and his family, and he has told agents that he is considering purchasing a shot gun to defend himself.

In view of the above and since there appears to be a question of [redacted] dependability and mental stability, no efforts are being made by this office to develop him as a Confidential National Defense Informant. [redacted] advised that he intended to go to London, England on November 12, 1949 for employment with the B.B.C. in London.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD SCHEIDT
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 pmj/mcl/jc

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. DECEMBER 27, 1949

Transmit the following message to: TO ALL SAC'S ... URGENT

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. BUREAU DESIRES TO BE FURNISHED WITH SEPARATE MEMORANDA ON EACH CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT IN YOUR OFFICE, BOTH PAID AND UNPAID. EACH MEMORANDUM IS TO BE PREPARED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER USING THE SUBHEADINGS AS INDICATED. THE INFORMANT'S NAME, TOGETHER WITH ALL HIS ALIASES AND HIS SYMBOL NUMBER WILL APPEAR IN THE CENTER OF THE PAGE. THE SUBHEADINGS WHICH MUST BE LISTED ON THE LEFT MARGIN ARE TO BE USED IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: ONE, BACKGROUND PARENTHESIS SET OUT UNDER THIS SUBHEADING IN ADDITION TO OTHER INFORMATION A STATEMENT AS TO LENGTH OF SERVICE AND AMOUNT PRESENTLY BEING PAID TO INFORMANT, PARENTHESIS; TWO, PRODUCTIVITY; THREE, TYPES OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY OR NAMES OF ORGANIZATIONS COVERED; FOUR, INFORMANT'S LABOR UNION AFFILIATION PARENTHESIS IN ADDITION TO UNION AFFILIATION, CLEARLY INDICATE WHETHER INFORMANT REPORTS ON AFFAIRS OF UNION OF WHICH HE IS MEMBER, PARENTHESIS; FIVE, COOPERATIVENESS OF INFORMANT PARENTHESIS INDICATE HEREIN DEGREE OF COOPERATIVENESS, DEPENDABILITY AND LOYALTY OR LACK THEREOF PARENTHESIS; SIX, CRIMINAL RECORD, PARENTHESIS UNDER THIS HEADING, IF INFORMANT HAS NO KNOWN CRIMINAL RECORD STATE QUOTE NONE UNQUOTE. IF THERE IS CRIMINAL RECORD, STATE QUOTE CRIMINAL RECORD ATTACHED UNQUOTE. YOU NEED NOT FURNISH CRIMINAL RECORD TO BUREAU AS IT WILL BE OBTAINED AT SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. PARENTHESIS ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE FOLLOWED EXPLICITLY. MEMORANDA MUST BE BRIEF AND CONCISE AND NOT EXCEED TWO PAGES IN LENGTH. THIS PROJECT MUST BE COMPLETED AND MAILED TO BUREAU NOT LATER THAN FIVE PM JANUARY FOUR NEXT.

66-2542-3-450

RECORDED - 121

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

#280309 HOOVER

WASHINGTON FIELD (BY SPECIAL MESSENGER)

INITIALED DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

DEC 28 1949 DEC 27 1949

JLS/esb COPIES DESTROYED

JUL 20 1961

R582

M Per

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
New York, 7, New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2540 DMC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 1-17-91
7-17-81

CONFIDENTIAL
December 7, 1949.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Director, FBI

Re: [redacted]
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted] (u)

b7D

Confidential Informant in General Intelligence work

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated October 12, 1949.

In accordance with Bureau instructions, [redacted] was interviewed on December 2, 1949. He advised that he intends to assist the New York Office in the investigation of Communist activities as follows: (u)

(1) Attendance at all meetings of the Casa de Galicia de Unidad Gallega, 313 West 59th Street, New York City. [redacted] has advised that this organization, which purports to be a Spanish social club, is in the process of being infiltrated by Communist elements and is, therefore, becoming a Communist front organization. [redacted], husband of [redacted], who is a leading Spanish Communist in New York City, is the Executive Secretary of the Casa de Galicia. (u)

(2) Attendance at events sponsored by the "La Nacional", Spanish Mutual Aid Society, which according to [redacted] is also being infiltrated by Communist elements. (u)

b7D

(3) Attendance at all open meetings sponsored by such organization as the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, the Coordinating Committee for a Spanish Republic, the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, and other Spanish pro-Communist organizations. [redacted] has submitted an excellent report on the dinner tendered by the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee to the Delegations to the United Nations which voted against admission of [redacted] Spain to the World Organization. In this report [redacted] gave a careful and detailed account of the reactions of the Polish and the Yugoslavian representatives to each other. [redacted] attached copies of speeches made by [redacted] Polish Representative, and by General [redacted], member of the Spanish Government in exile, and furnished very good summaries of other speeches. (u)

DECLASSIFIED BY 2540 DMC/JC ON 12/27/91

VAL:EED
62-10163

60 JAN 16 1950

RECORDED
APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND ADVISED
SLIP
DATE 10/20/81 amt

Class 166-25 Serial 45

5 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential Letter to Director
NY 62-10163

(4) Information concerning Dominican revolutionary activity. This informant has indicated that he has very good personal relations with the Dominican Organization in New York City. In the past the Bureau has received many requests from the United States Department of State for information concerning Dominican activities and the individuals connected with them. (U)

[redacted] (5) Information concerning Spanish Republican groups. [redacted] has advised that he is in a position to furnish information concerning activity by the Alvarez del Vayo, Negrin, and other Spanish Republican groups. (U) b7D

(6) Information concerning visiting foreign Communists. This informant has stated that the Basque Organization frequently receives information concerning foreign Communists in transit through the United States. He has offered to make such information available to the New York Office. (U)

(7) Following the activities of the group conducting the radio program, "Voice of Fighting Spain". The principal individuals involved are [redacted] and [redacted]A, all leading Spanish Communists in New York City. [redacted] knows all these individuals and believes that he can cultivate their acquaintance more extensively. (U) b7D

[redacted] resides at [redacted] New York City, Telephone ORchard 4-6260. This is also the address of the Basque Delegation to the United States. It is anticipated that he will be contacted by SA VICTOR A. LEMAITRE. [redacted] is being assigned Confidential Informant symbol [redacted] (U)

[redacted] has advised that the financial situation of the Basque Delegation is not good and that for this reason some compensation is desirable. Inasmuch as this informant is believed to be in a position to obtain valuable information, the Bureau is requested to authorize payment of [redacted] monthly to [redacted] plus refund of expenses not to exceed [redacted] a month, for a trial period of three months. (U)

Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt

EDWARD SCHEIDT
SAC

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC, New York

12-27-49

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR, FBI

b7D

[redacted] PERSONAL ATTENTION

(NY: 62-10163)

451

REURLET dated December 7, 1949, advising that the above-named individual was in a position to furnish current information on Spanish - Communist activity and related matters in the New York area.

Based upon your personal request authority is given to begin payments to DeGalindez up to [redacted] per month, plus expenses not to exceed $30.00 per month, for a trial period of 3 months effective January 1, 1950.

Two weeks prior to the expiration of the authorized period you should submit an informative summary and your personal recommendation as to the informant's continuance.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 pm/mc/jc
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FCIM, II, 1-2-2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91
7-17-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
DATE 9-2-82

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
DATE 10/20/81 BMJ

DECLASSIFIED BY sp7mac/dd
ON 12/2/87
276599

RECEIVED BY ... DEPT OF JUSTICE
DEC 27 7 05 PM '49

cc - Mr. Gunsser, 5505

JDD:wma

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 6 1950

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI
STATES DEPARTMENT OF

CC-150

CONFIDENTIAL

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. 1-5-50 C

Transmit the following message to: SAC'S ATLANTA, BALTIMORE, BIRMINGHAM, BOSTON, DALLAS, LOS ANGELES, LOUISVILLE, RICHMOND, SAN ANTONIO, SAN JUAN, SPRINGFIELD, WASHINGTON FIELD

ROUTINE - CODE

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, CNDIS. ADVISE WHEN REPORT SUBMITTED.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 6-8-94

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 pm DMC JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FCIM, V, 2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91
7-17-81

HOOVER ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

6-1-93 Classified by 9833 DDJ/bjs
Declassify on: OADR

JDD:ed (GAS)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND ... CLASS 10/20/81 BMS

Enc th 0025-0028

#060021 To San Juan

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RECORDED - 69

66-2542-3 452

EX-87

TELETYPE

JAN 5 1950 C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Carson
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Hendon
Pennington
Quinn Tamm
Nease
Miss Gandy

8:42 PM

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 16 1950

SENT VIA Bureau Radio 1/5/50 7:33 P M Per M.W.

66-2542-3-453

CHANGED TO

61-8381-633X13

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-81 BY 2842 PM/MCJC

5 FEB 20 1951

C

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-13-2014

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY F65M72K70 REVIEW COMMITTEE
DATE: 12-8-94

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Conshire 1337 10

Olson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED SUBJECT TO CLASS DATE 10/20/81 BMS

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2846 Omimc JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FCIM (U) 1.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91 7-17-81

DECODED COPY (U)

FROM SAVANNAH 12-30-49 NR 301930 3:15 P.M.

DIRECTOR

(U) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. REFERENCE TO YOUR TELETYPE DECEMBER 28 LAST. MEMORANDA PRESENTLY BEING PREPARED THIS OFFICE ON ALL INFORMANTS WITH SYMBOL NUMBERS. THIS OFFICE ALSO HAS 137 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS TO WHOM NO SYMBOLS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED. THESE INCLUDE HOTEL MANAGERS, BELLBOYS, WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY AND TELEPHONE COMPANY CONTACTS, ET CETERA. ADVISE IF BUREAU DESIRES MEMORANDA ON THESE INFORMANTS WITHOUT SYMBOL NUMBERS.

(c) N General intelligence work

RECEIVED 12-30-49 (U) P.M. LL

Orig: Det. Div.

66-25 Ser 2

NOT RECORDED
71 JAN 11 1950

ORIGINAL FILE IN

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9020 RDD/bjs 6-1-93
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-13-2014

F65M72K70

...hs

...DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA...

...TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ...

CONFIDENTIAL

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

(URGENT - CODE UNDERLINED WORDS) (U)

Transmit the following message to:

SAC SAVANNAH JANUARY 4, 1950 (U)

RE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. (U) [RECEIVED DECEMBER THIRTY LAST.] (U) SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY MEMORANDA PREPARED BY YOUR OFFICE ON INFORMANTS WITH SYMBOL NUMBERS. THEREAFTER PREPARE AND SUBMIT BUREAU PROMPTLY INDIVIDUAL MEMORANDA ON INFORMANTS WITHOUT SYMBOL NUMBERS FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS [BUREAUTEL DECEMBER TWENTY-EIGHT.] (U)

HOOVER

JLS:TD

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED ... DATE 10/29/81 BM

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMD MCJC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2-4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-17-91

7-17-81

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

6-1-93
Classified by 9803RDD/bjs
Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT ...

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

JAN 1 ... (U)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-8-94

ORIGINAL

Donohue
Bird

The Commissioner,
Immigration and Naturalization Service

January 18, 1950

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] was

b7D

INTERNAL SECURITY - C
FBI File 100-61314

Reference is made to our previous correspondence in connection with this case.

Please be advised that one [redacted] has furnished a volume of information concerning Pirinsky which has been set forth in FBI reports in this case, previously furnished to your Service.

His identity is being disclosed to you as he has indicated his willingness to testify in deportation proceedings against Pirinsky.

A summary of all of the information to which Cvetic is able to testify concerning [redacted] Communist affiliations and activities presently is being prepared by this Bureau's Pittsburgh Office and will be forwarded to you as soon as it may be received.

b7D

It is suggested, however, that you may wish to have Cvetic interviewed immediately by representatives of your Service in view of his present amenability, rather than to wait for the above-mentioned summary.

It is important to note that he is using the cover name of [redacted] which should be used in contacting him. He resides in [redacted] Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

co- 66-2542

INDEXED - 31

454

NOT RECORDED
81 JAN 24 1950

GEI:tg

EX-97

Original copy filed in

Nelson
Ladd
Clegg
Clavin
Nichols

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 DMD MCJC
ON 7-12-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ... Class
SUPP(S) ...
DATE 10/20/81 AMS